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INTRODUCTION 
Like the diffusion of water that has spilled over its 
riverbank, the legal concept of an offer has spread from its 
contract law origins into areas of the law as diverse as 
criminal law and intellectual property law.  The spread of this 
common law concept has occurred without much attention or 
analysis, an oversight that this Article seeks to redress. 
In analyzing the spread of the offer concept throughout 
the law, the following Part I deconstructs the contract law 
meaning of an offer and demonstrates that while the offer 
concept continues to play a policy role in the law of contracts, 
it is at best a secondary policy tool.  Part II of this Article 
surveys several areas of the law that have imported the offer 
concept and analyzes how each area uses the concept to 
achieve policy goals.  The analysis shows that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the policies underlying the offer concept in 
these various areas of law differ from the original contract 
law policies.  Surprisingly, however, while at times 
lawmakers have extensively modified the definition of an 
offer to better achieve specific policy objectives, at other times 
lawmakers have imported the offer concept with no apparent 
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analysis of whether and how they should modify the 
definition to best achieve policy objectives. 
Part III provides a case study of patent law’s use of the 
offer concept to regulate patent infringement.  This study is 
divided into two parts: the first part provides a normative 
analysis of how the offer concept should be used to regulate 
patent infringement, and the second part analyzes the 
legislative text and context of the offer concept as it currently 
appears in patent law.  The study reveals that the legislature 
appears to have given little thought to how it should use the 
offer concept in patent law, and courts interpret the term 
“offer” in such a manner as to cling to an ill-fitted contract 
law definition.  Part IV provides observations on and 
suggestions for using the offer concept as a policy tool in 
patent law and beyond. 
I. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONTRACT LAW OFFER 
The concept of an offer that an offeree may accept to 
create a contract is a pillar of contract law.  First-year law 
students spend numerous contracts classes immersed in the 
complexities of offers: offers can be terminated by a counter-
offer, rejection, the death of the offeror, revocation, lapse, and 
so on (and the rules all change if the offer is an option).1  
Based on the attention given to the offer concept in law 
school, one might think it has existed as long as the law itself.  
It has not. 
Instead, the offer concept is only one of several tools 
(including acceptance and consideration) adopted to explain 
and regulate contract formation.  In fact, the formal concept 
of an offer did not appear until about the mid-eighteenth 
century, when Pothier2 developed it (along with acceptance) 
in French law.3  After that development, the concept 
eventually migrated to England and America.  Precursors of 
the concept can be found in Roman law, but the formalized 
 
 1. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 36–37 (1981). 
 2. Robert Joseph Pothier (1699–1772) was a French jurist who had an 
enormous influence in the law of contracts in Europe, England, and America, 
and he is best known for his work TRAITE D’OBLIGATIONS (1761).  See Joseph M. 
Perillo, Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 267, 267 n.1, 269 (2005). 
 3. See Parviz Owsia, The Notion and Function of Offer and Acceptance 
Under French and English Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 871, 873–75 (1992). 
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concepts of a sequential offer and acceptance did not exist 
until Pothier identified them, and the concepts did not gain 
prominence until the nineteenth century.4  As the renowned 
legal historian A.W.B. Simpson explains it, the offer-and-
acceptance doctrine grew out of the requirement of 
consideration and performed some of the same functions.5 
The simplicity and concreteness of an offer that the 
offeree can accept makes a wonderful pedagogical tool.  
Though a formal offer need not be identified for a contract to 
exist,6 many contracts textbooks treat offers prominently in 
the discussion of contract formation.7  Focusing on offer and 
acceptance—the sequence that creates a great number of 
contracts—helps people conceptualize the contract formation 
process. 
In addition to being a good pedagogical tool, the offer 
concept helps justify and regulate the contract formation 
process.  For example, when analyzing a simple offer of 
exchange (“I offer to sell you a book for $10”), one might 
conclude that the statement should have the potential to bind 
the speaker as a normative matter because people ought 
generally to do what they say they will do.8  Or, one might 
believe an offer should be able to bind the speaker because, as 
a matter of efficiency, the offeree should be able to rely on the 
offeror’s promise so that the offeree can best arrange his 
subsequent affairs.9 
But to identify one example of an offer does not define an 
offer, and the simple example of the sale of a book for money 
masks many questions.  For example, assuming that society 
 
 4. See id. at 873–75; see also A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth 
Century Contract Law, 91 L.Q. REV. 247, 258–62 (1975). 
 5. Simpson, supra note 4, at 258. 
 6. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made 
in any manner sufficient to show agreement . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 126 (7th ed. 2008) (“Nonetheless, it is useful at least to begin with 
the assumption of a clear offer followed by a clear acceptance.”). 
 8. This statement invites debate about whether an offer is a promise, a 
debate that is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 273–78 (2004) (and sources 
cited therein); Samuel Williston, An Offer is a Promise, 23 ILL. L. REV. 100 
(1928); Samuel Williston, Is An Offer a Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 788 (1928). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 481, 501–09 (1996); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing 
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
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does not want every promise to be legally binding as a 
contract,10 one must decide when contracts (that is, binding 
promises) exist and when they do not.  To assist in drawing 
the line between legally enforceable and unenforceable 
promises, the common law developed a formal definition of an 
offer: “the manifestation of willingness to enter into a 
bargain, so made as to justify another person in 
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and 
will conclude it.”11  As discussed below, this definition results 
largely from the balancing that contract law performs in 
allowing parties to enter into contracts as easily as possible 
and not allowing contracts to be entered into so easily as to 
become a nuisance. 
On the one hand, traditional contract law seeks to ensure 
that individuals have the freedom to enter into contracts 
according to their will and without having to comply with 
rigid formalities.  This freedom may be called “freedom to 
contract,” and it includes the notion that ordinary people 
should generally be able to order their affairs as they wish 
through contracts and do so without the need for lawyers, 
other experts, or sophisticated rituals.12  A sufficient measure 
of freedom to contract protects individuals’ autonomy by 
allowing them to enter into contracts if they choose13 and 
facilitates an efficient economy in which parties can bind 
themselves and their trading partners in enforceable 
contracts with relative ease and little formality. 
On the other hand, traditional contract law also seeks to 
ensure that individuals are free from having contractual 
obligations imposed on them unexpectedly.  This freedom 
may be referred to as “freedom from contract,” and it is rooted 
 
 10. Who, after all, wants to be legally bound to every idle promise, such as a 
promise to call a friend back in a few minutes? 
 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 12. See Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R. Eq. 462, 
465 (V.C. 1875) (“[M]en of full age and competent understanding shall have the 
utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely 
and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.”).  
See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
(1979); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the ‘Rise and Fall,’ 
79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999). 
 13. The objective theory of contracts places some limits on an individual’s 
autonomy, since whether an act is an offer is judged objectively and not with 
reference to the offeror’s subjective choices/intentions.  E.g., Wayne Barnes, The 
Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2008). 
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in similar concerns for autonomy and economic efficiency.14  It 
embodies the notions that freedom includes the ability to 
avoid becoming contractually bound except through the 
informed exercise of the will15 and that economic efficiency is 
best attained when parties are able to engage in negotiations 
without fear of incurring unintended contractual liability 
(since they might otherwise forgo negotiations altogether, 
possibly ending all but the simplest transactions).16 
Thus it may be said that the traditional rules governing 
contract formation represent tools used to balance freedom to 
contract and freedom from contract, making contracts neither 
too difficult nor too easy to create.17  Among the balancing 
tools the law uses is the concept of an offer, traditionally the 
first step in creating a contract.18  The offer definition helps 
protect the freedom to contract by allowing offers to result 
from myriad manifestations of willingness to enter into a 
bargain.  Instead of requiring the offeror19 to use special 
words or rituals, the definition permits a broad array of 
actions (including but not limited to words) to constitute an 
offer, making it easy (but as explained immediately below, 
not too easy) for the offer to come into being.20  Further, the 
offeror can define the terms of the eventual bargain and can 
 
 14. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealings and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 
(1987) (discussing the traditional view of freedom from contract); Omri Ben-
Shahar, Freedom From Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 261, 261 (2004). 
 15. Again, the offeror’s choice is limited in some respects by the objective 
interpretation of his acts.  See Barnes, supra note 13. 
 16. E.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 14, at 267–68 (describing arguments in 
favor of freedom from contract). 
 17. See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929, 948 (1958) (“A good legal rule as to the enforceability of promises 
should make contracting available to nonlawyers who will take pains to clarify 
their ideas as to what they want to contract about; yet it should not make 
contracting so easy that it hooks the unwary signer or the casual promisor.  The 
first may be called freedom to contract, the second, freedom from contract.”). 
 18. An offer and its corresponding acceptance typically constitute the 
bargained-for consideration necessary to support the parties’ promises. 
 19. Throughout this Article, I refer to the offeror as the party who proposes 
a potential bargain, regardless of whether her actions qualify as a formal offer. 
 20. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 108 
(Joseph M. Perillo, ed., rev. ed. 1993) (“[T]here is no magic formula to determine 
whether a particular communication is an offer . . . .[T]he ordinary meaning of 
language is influential, but never determinative.  For example, the word ‘quote’ 
may be understood as making a commitment, while the word ‘offer’ may, in 
context be deemed a mere price quotation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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require an acceptance to take a certain form. 
Additionally, the offer definition protects freedom from 
contract by placing an important restriction on the 
manifestations that can constitute an offer: the manifestation 
must be clear enough so that the offeree should understand 
that his “assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude 
it.”21  That is, the manifestation, while not forced into any 
particular form or language, must meet a minimum degree of 
formality such that it is clear that the offeror seriously 
contemplates a binding deal.  The law includes this hesitancy 
to label conduct as an offer because of the offeror’s 
vulnerability should the label attach: once an offer has been 
communicated, the power to create a contract shifts almost 
entirely to the offeree, who need only indicate assent.22  That 
is, by labeling something an “offer,” the law puts the parties 
one step (acceptance) away from transforming their 
relationship from a pre-contractual environment of individual 
autonomy and personal norms to a post-contractual 
environment that, while presumably centered on terms to 
which the parties voluntarily agreed, nevertheless contains 
government-imposed responsibilities23 and remedies.24  In 
light of the power shift from the offeror to the offeree, if the 
law too readily labels conduct an offer, potential offerors 
might reduce their interactions for fear of being exposed to 
undesired legal liability or might incur wasteful transaction 
costs in an effort to ensure that their conduct is not treated as 
an offer.25 
 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 22. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.10, at 131 (4th ed. 2004) 
(“Courts have reason for caution, since to hold the maker of a proposal to a 
contract exposes the maker to liability based on the recipient’s expectation 
interest, even in the absence of any reliance.”).  The offeror may not be 
completely vulnerable; she may be able to revoke.  In addition, the offeror can 
prescribe particular manners by which the offeree must accept. 
 23. For example, the law provides gap-filling terms even though the parties 
never agreed on them.  See, e.g., id. §§ 7.15–.17, at 480–500. 
 24. Although an individual who backs out of selling an item before making 
an offer might face the ire of the potential purchaser and other friends, if 
instead the individual has made a formal offer, the other party may accept 
immediately and hold the seller liable for either specific performance or 
damages.  See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
1:1, at 3 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007) (defining a contract as a promise for 
which the law will provide a remedy when it is breached). 
 25. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 14, at 267–68; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 
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Thus, to prevent contractual obligations from surprising 
parties who did not intend currently to be bound, contract law 
sets the bar for what constitutes an offer higher than it 
otherwise might: to be an offer, a communication must be 
sufficiently clear to be accepted without anything other than 
an offeree giving a return promise or performing the required 
action.26  This principle of restraint has caused courts to tend 
to distinguish offers from mere negotiations, advertisements, 
and invitations to offer, rationalizing the exclusions on the 
ground that “neither the advertiser nor the reader of the 
[advertisement] understands that the reader is empowered to 
close the deal without further expression by the advertiser.”27  
This view has been challenged, with some scholars calling for 
courts to presume advertisements and similar 
communications are offers.28  The common law presumption 
that advertisements are generally not offers remains, 
however, and its rationale, while not irrefutable, is not 
unreasonable.  For example, it lessens the likelihood that an 
advertiser will unintentionally enter into a contract (or too 
many contracts).29 
Contract law could, of course, choose a more active policy 
role for the offer concept, such as using it to police false 
 
CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1178 (1994) (noting that liability concerns might reduce the 
amount of contracting, but also arguing that making contracting too difficult 
would reduce people’s autonomy to choose to enter into contracts). 
 26. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 3.3, at 110 (“[An offer] can be defined 
as a manifestation to another of assent to enter into a contract if the other 
manifests assent in return by some action, often a promise but sometimes a 
performance.  By making the offer, the offeror thus confers upon the offeree the 
power to create a contract.” (footnote omitted)).  Other doctrines, including 
consideration, also slow contract formation. 
 27. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 116. 
 28. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 1167–68 (“Suppose a store advertises 
17” Sony TVs at $350, a customer comes in and says he will buy the TV at that 
price, and the salesman responds, ‘We’re not selling the set at $350, but we’ll 
sell it at $400.’  The reaction of the customer would not be, as Corbin would 
have it, ‘Of course; I understand; your advertisement was only inviting me to 
consider and examine and negotiate,’ but instead, ‘You people are liars, cheats, 
or both.’ ” ); Jay M. Feinman & Stephen R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer? 
Why It Is and Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2006) (arguing that 
advertisements are offers). 
 29. Contract law recognizes that advertisements may be specific enough to 
constitute an offer, such as where they specify the price, quantity, and who may 
make the purchase (e.g., first come, first served).  See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Great 
Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957). In addition, 
many other laws regulate advertisements.  See infra note 30. 
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advertising; it has not taken that path though, and is content 
to let the offer concept take a lesser policy role compared to 
other formation doctrines, such as consideration.30  In 
addition, concerns about fairness and false advertising are 
largely policed by laws outside of the traditional contract 
realm, such as unfair and deceptive trade practice laws.31 
Rather than increasing in significance, the role of the 
offer has decreased since its zenith in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth-century, after which scholars increasingly 
observed some of the weaknesses of a rigid and oversimplified 
offer-and-acceptance approach to contract formation.32  The 
usefulness and preeminence of a strict offer-and-acceptance 
paradigm began to strain under the weight of standardized 
forms, the so-called battle of the forms, and evermore complex 
deals involving non-serial communications between 
individuals, but rather rounds of negotiation involving 
managers, officers, and lawyers.  These complexities make it 
difficult to pinpoint a formal offer.33  In many sophisticated 
negotiations, there is no explicit offer for a party to accept and 
thus there is “little occasion to apply the classic rules of offer 
and acceptance.”34 
Recognizing these difficulties, courts have at times 
abolished the all-or-nothing formation test, ignored the 
 
 30. This is not surprising, as the offer definition largely grew out of, and 
incorporates the doctrine of, bargained-for consideration.  See Simpson, supra 
note 4, at 258. 
 31. Various federal and state laws regulate advertising and other unfair 
and deceptive trade practices to protect consumers.  See, e.g., Anthony Paul 
Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of State 
Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984) (discussing 
various consumer protection laws); Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: 
Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching v. State Unfair and 
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 
575, 582–89 (1989) (discussing state unfair and deceptive trade practices that 
may impact contracts); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade 
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437 
(1991) (discussing FTC consumer protection laws).  It is likely that the laws 
concerning unfair and deceptive trade practices are a better avenue for policing 
fairness issues than offer and acceptance, but that analysis is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 32. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the 
Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 205–06 (1917); K.N. Llewellyn, On 
Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 14–29 
(1938). 
 33. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 218–20. 
 34. Id. at 219. 
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search for an offer, and even held parties liable pre-
contractually.35  In addition to the decreasing significance of 
the contract law offer, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code,36 a model code governing the sale of goods, 
demonstrates the decline of the offer by explicitly dispensing 
with the requirements of an identifiable offer37 and moment of 
formation.38 
In conclusion, while the offer concept continues to play a 
policy role in the law of contracts, for example in helping to 
balance freedom-from and freedom-to contract, it is a 
secondary policy tool.  The next section demonstrates that, in 
stark contrast to contract law, the offer concept plays a more 
overt policy role in other areas of the law to which it has 
migrated, including trademark law,39 securities law,40 
environmental law,41 criminal law,42 and patent law.43  The 
policies underlying the offer concept in these various areas of 
law differ from the original contract law policies, and in many 
instances lawmakers have extensively modified the definition 
of an offer to better achieve specific policy objectives.  At other 
times, however, lawmakers have imported the offer concept 
with no apparent analysis of whether the contract law 
definition is congruent with the new legal environment or 
whether and how they should modify the definition to best 
achieve policy objectives.  As will be seen, this has led to 
confusion and sub-optimal roles for the offer concept. 
 
 35. See generally id.; Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969). 
 36. The U.C.C. came about through a joint project between the National 
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law 
Institute in the 1940s.  JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI 
AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.7, at 15 (6th ed. 2009).  After revisions, every 
state except Louisiana adopted a version of the U.C.C. (though with various 
modifications) between 1957 and 1967.  Id. 
 37. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made 
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties 
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”). 
 38. See id. § 2-204(2) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for 
sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”). 
 39. See infra Part II.A. 
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
 41. See infra Part II.C. 
 42. See infra Part II.D. 
 43. See infra Part III. 
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II. USE OF THE OFFER CONCEPT OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT LAW 
As discussed in the preceding section, the contract law 
definition of an offer helps balance freedom-from and 
freedom-to contract and emphasizes the offeror’s actions and 
their effect on the offeree (i.e., the offeree must reasonably 
understand that her assent is invited and will conclude the 
bargain).  From this, one can make two important 
observations about the definition and function of an offer in 
contract law: first, it focuses almost exclusively on the offeror 
and the offeree, as opposed to third parties or society at large; 
and second, contract law asks not simply whether the 
purported offer might have piqued the offeree’s commercial 
interest, but rather whether it gave her reason to believe she 
could conclude the bargain with nothing more than an 
acceptance. 
The areas of the law outside of contract law that employ 
the offer concept44 do so in a dramatically different way.  
Contract law’s concerns about freedom-from and freedom-to 
contract are minimal.  Additionally, outside of contract law 
the focus shifts more strongly from particular offerees to 
society more generally.  Finally, the areas outside of contract 
law are more concerned about whether the purported offer 
might have piqued the offeree’s commercial interest and less 
about whether it gave the offeree reason to believe she could 
conclude a bargain.  As will be discussed, the new roles for 
the offer concept generally result in definitions for the offer 
concept that differ from the contract law definition. 
A. Trademark Law 
The Lanham Act45 is the principle source of federal law 
governing trademarks.  Trademark law is justified by a 
variety of policies, including consumer protection,46 protection 
 
 44. I use the phrase offer concept to refer to formal, contract law offers and 
less formal commercial promotions (e.g., advertisements and quotes) that would 
not qualify as formal offers. 
 45. Lanham Act §§ 1–45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–29, 1141–
41n (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic 
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699 (1997) (“The primary stated purpose for 
legal recognition of trademark rights is to prevent consumer confusion. . . . 
Consumers . . . use the mark as a signal of the quality of goods, expecting that 
goods branded with the mark will be of the quality they have come to associate 
with past purchases bearing the mark.”). 
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of property,47 and economic efficiency.48  Under the consumer 
protection rationale, trademark law protects consumers 
against confusion as to the quality and source of certain 
goods: consumers associate a trademark with the producer of 
those goods, and thus the quality of the goods.49  Under the 
property and economic efficiency rationales, trademark law 
encourages companies to invest in high quality goods by 
protecting consumers’ associations between the high quality 
goods and the producer.50  Because the trademark owner can 
control who uses the trademark (and thus its associated 
consumer goodwill), trademark owners will be willing to 
invest in quality goods to build up goodwill.51  Further, under 
the efficiency justification, trademarks reduce consumer 
search costs when shopping because the trademark serves as 
a short-hand identifier of a specific source for desired goods or 
services.52 
Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act imposes liability on a 
person who, without permission, uses a registered mark “in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services . . . [if] such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”53  
A quintessential example of trademark infringement is a 
person who purposefully sells inferior, non-Coca-Cola soda 
with a Coca-Cola label on it.  Such a fraudulent sale infringes 
 
 47. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the dual goals of trademark law to 
“protect both consumers from deception and confusion over trade symbols and 
to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as property”).  
 48. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987). 
 49. Burk, supra note 46, at 699–700. 
 50. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) 
(“[T]rademarks foster . . . the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation.”). 
 51. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) 
(“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourages[s] the production of quality 
products.’ ”  (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[1] (3d ed. 1992))). 
 52. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs 
by informing people that trademarked products come from the same source.”); 
see Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 269. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). The Lanham Act also covers nonregistered 
trademarks in § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
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the Coca-Cola trademark and implicates trademark law’s 
consumer protection and economic efficiency rationales: the 
consumer is harmed because it buys the inferior product 
believing it is Coca-Cola, the owner of the Coca-Cola 
trademark has lost incentive to invest in its brand, and 
consumers have less ability to use the name Coca-Cola as 
shorthand for a source of a specific good they desire. 
The Lanham Act not only precludes actual sales of 
infringing (mislabeled) soda, but also invokes the offer 
concept and prohibits the offering for sale and advertising of 
any goods or services that are likely to cause confusion, even 
if those offers and advertisements do not actually lead to 
infringing sales.54  By prohibiting infringing advertisements, 
the Lanham Act uses the offer concept in a broader manner 
than does contract law, which excludes most advertisements 
from its offer concept.55  Infringement based on an 
advertisement can be found, for example, if the advertisement 
promotes counterfeit goods.  Rather than having to wait to 
bring suit based on an actual sale, the trademark owner may 
bring suit based on the advertisement alone if it can 
demonstrate that the advertisement is likely to lead to a 
confusing sale.56 
In addition, courts have identified a second situation 
where infringement can be based on an advertisement or offer 
to sell.  Suppose a fan of Coca-Cola passes by a store with a 
large sign that reads, “Cold Coca-Cola brand soda inside,” 
but, upon entering the store she is informed by the sales clerk 
that the store does not sell Coca-Cola soda, but does offer its 
own brand of soda.57  She is thirsty, and having been lured by 
the sign mentioning Coca-Cola, might be tempted to buy the 
off-brand soda since she has already stopped in and has soda 
on her mind.  There is no confusion at the time of sale (she 
knows it is not Coca-Cola), but the advertisement caused her 
to stop in rather than continue walking. 
 
 54. See Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
 55. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 56. See 1 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN & DONNA M.D. THOMAS, THE LAW OF 
ADVERTISING § 11.02[5][b] (Matthew Bender ed., 2012) (stating that a cause of 
action for false advertising under section 32 of the Lanham Act requires, among 
other things, a showing of a likelihood of confusion). 
 57. This hypothetical is borrowed from ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. 
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND 
TRADEMARKS § 29.2.1, at 650–51 (2003). 
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In this situation, the advertiser may be liable under a 
theory of initial-interest confusion, so named because even 
though the consumer is not confused at the time of purchase, 
she arguably only became interested because of the 
misleading advertisement.58  Courts widely recognize initial-
interest confusion as a means by which a trademark owner 
can enforce its rights against others.59  Commentators 
likewise generally approve of the doctrine in theory, though 
they often argue that courts should apply it with more 
discretion.60 
Trademark law’s consumer protection and economic 
efficiency policies suggest that an infringing offer or 
advertisement should be prohibited, even if it is not followed 
by an infringing sale.  If trademark law did not prohibit 
advertisements that use another’s trademark, competitors 
might bombard buyers with misleading advertisements or 
offers.  The advertisement or offer harms the consumer by 
misleading him61 and diverting his attention and efforts62 
 
 58. Id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 47, § 23.6 
(“[Trademark infringement] can be based upon confusion that creates initial 
customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of 
the confusion.”).  The advertiser might also be liable under other false 
advertising and deceptive practices laws.  See supra note 31. 
 59. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 
(2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing initial interest confusion); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. 
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-
Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). 
 60. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 813–28 (2004) 
(arguing, primarily in the internet/metatag context, that initial interest 
confusion should apply where advertisers use deception to misdirect customers 
to their products, but not where advertisers use another’s trademark to give 
consumers additional accurate information); Eric Goldman, Deregulating 
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 559–95 (2005) 
(criticizing initial interest confusion in the internet context and proposing 
solutions to its shortcomings); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic 
and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1593–97 (2010) 
(arguing for discernment before applying the doctrine of initial interest 
confusion too broadly); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest 
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105 (2005) (advocating limits on the initial interest confusion doctrine).  But see 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 469–75 
(1999) (presenting arguments that the Lanham Act was not intended to 
encompass confusion other than as to source). 
 61. Professor Eisenberg, discussing contract law, anticipates the consumer 
harm from false advertisements similar to trademark’s initial interest 
confusion.  See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 1167–68 (“Suppose a store 
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based on the misrepresentation.  The infringing offer or 
advertisement likewise dampens the trademark owner’s 
incentive to invest in its brand, since it has lost control over 
how the mark is used.63  Finally, the infringing offer or 
advertisement interrupts the search-cost efficiency that 
trademark law seeks to promote because consumers lose the 
ability to rely on the trademark as a meaningful identifier.64 
Although the Lanham Act specifically includes 
advertising within its offer concept, it does not define the 
term.  Advertising is a potentially broad term that may 
include any “action of drawing the public’s attention to 
something to promote its sale.”65  Case law interpreting the 
Lanham Act has not coalesced around a single definition, and 
while widely-distributed commercial promotion clearly 
constitutes advertising, courts have struggled with 
promotional activities that are distributed less widely or 
distributed to an audience other than the final consumers.66 
The Lanham Act complicates matters in that while § 32 
prohibits advertising, § 43(a)(1)(B) subjects certain 
misrepresentations made in commercial advertising or 
promotion to liability.67  The majority of courts interpreting 
whether an act constitutes advertising under the Lanham Act 
 
advertises 17” Sony TVs at $350, a customer comes in and says he will buy the 
TV at that price, and the salesman responds, ‘We’re not selling the set at $350, 
but we’ll sell it at $400.’ The reaction of the customer would . . . [be] ‘You people 
are liars, cheats, or both.’ ” ). 
 62. Of course, each individual diversion might be rather small, such as the 
customer who takes a minute to stop into the store advertising Coca-Cola.  But 
the cumulative effect on many consumers could be very great: as some point, 
consumers would not trust any billboard, store/restaurant name, advertisement, 
etc. 
 63. See Park ‘n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
 64. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g , Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (7th ed. 1999).  
 66. See ASTRACHAN & THOMAS, supra note 56, at § 11.02[5][f], at 11-200 
n.356 (collecting cases). 
 67. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“Any person 
who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, 
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial 
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”). 
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do so under § 43(a)(1)(B), and while they energetically 
suggest a distinction exists between advertising and 
promotion, they seldom identify it, except to note that 
promotion indicates something broader than traditional 
advertising.68  The Second Circuit provided some assistance 
when it observed: 
[T]he distinction between advertising and promotion lies 
in the form of the representation.  Although advertising is 
generally understood to consist of widespread 
communication through print or broadcast media, 
‘promotion’ may take other forms of publicity used in the 
relevant industry, such as displays at trade shows and 
sales presentations to buyers.69 
Regardless of the precise line between advertising and 
promotion, because § 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits 
infringing use in advertisements as well as offers to sell,70 its 
offer concept is broader than the contract law definition, 
which generally excludes advertisements.71  The Lanham 
Act’s broadening of the offer concept to include advertising is 
unsurprising in light of the trademark law’s policies: as 
shown by the Coca-Cola example above, consumer confusion 
and economic inefficiency may result whether the infringing 
 
 68. See, e.g., Gmurzynska v. Hutton, 355 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]lthough representations less formal than those made as part of a classic 
advertising campaign may suffice, they must be disseminated sufficiently to the 
relevant purchasing public.”); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 
1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The courts are also in agreement, however, that ‘the Act’s 
reach is broader than merely the ‘classic advertising campaign.’ ”  (quoting 
Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., STBS, Ltd. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1994))). 
 69. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 57 
(2d Cir. 2002).  When it comes to deciding what communications can constitute 
advertising or promotion, courts vary widely, with some allowing very few 
communications to suffice.  See ASTRACHAN & THOMAS, supra note 56, at § 
11.02, at 11-200 n.356 (collecting cases).  Compare First Health Grp. Corp. v. 
BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Advertising is a 
form of promotion to anonymous recipients, as distinguished from face-to-face 
communication.  In normal usage, an advertisement read by millions (or even 
thousands in a trade magazine) is advertising, while a person-to-person pitch by 
an account executive is not.”), with Seven-Up Co., 86 F.3d at 1382–87 (finding 
that the presentation made to eleven bottlers is advertising or promotion), and 
Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005, 
1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding a single letter actionable under § 43). 
 70. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) (providing for 
infringement “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services” (emphasis added)). 
 71. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
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action is a formal contract law offer or merely an 
advertisement.72 
B. Securities Act of 1933 
One of the primary laws regulating the sale of securities 
invokes the offer concept to help regulate certain unwanted 
behaviors.  Developed in the aftermath of the 1929 stock 
market crash, the 1933 Securities Act73 regulates a majority 
of public offerings of securities, such as initial public 
offerings.  The Securities Act’s preamble states that the act 
seeks “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of 
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and 
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof  
. . . .”74  To provide full and fair disclosure and thus help 
protect investors, the act generally requires offering 
companies to file registration statements with the Securities 
& Exchange Commission (SEC) that include ample 
information about the securities (e.g., via a prospectus), 
which in turn helps to “assure that the investor has adequate 
information upon which to base his or her investment 
decision.”75 
The registration statement is one of the most significant 
steps a company intending to offer securities must complete, 
and the Securities Act uses the offer concept in conjunction 
with the registration statement to regulate securities 
offerings.  For example, the act prohibits the sale of securities 
unless a registration statement is in effect for those 
securities.76  In addition, the act uses the offer concept to 
protect consumers by imposing liability on persons who offer 
 
 72. It can be argued that many, if not all, of these concerns could be 
addressed by existing laws against false advertising and unfair and deceptive 
trade practices.  See supra notes 31 and 60. 
 73. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1–28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–bbbb (2006).  This 
Article focuses on selected provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, but other 
statutes provide various forms of protection to investors, such as the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
 74. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (preamble) (1934). 
 75. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION, § 2.2[1][A], at 214 (West 6th ed. 2009). 
 76. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (“Unless a 
registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly . . . to sell such security . . . .”). 
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to sell securities before a registration statement is filed.77  In 
particular, section 5(c)78 prohibits gun-jumping, which is 
offering a security before the issuer, underwriter, or dealer 
has filed a registration statement.79 
The prohibition of premature offers to sell demonstrates 
that Congress felt that regulating only actual sales, to the 
exclusion of offers to sell, would not fulfill its goal of providing 
adequate protection to investors.  Moreover, Congress defined 
offer (and offer to sell and offer for sale) more broadly than 
the contract law definition and included within the definition 
“every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer 
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”80  The 
definition thus would include advertisements, solicitations, 
and other commercializing activities that would fall short of a 
contract law offer. 
A justification for the offer concept’s broad definition in 
the act can be found in the SEC’s decision In re Carl M. Loeb, 
Rhoades & Co.:81 
 The broad sweep of these definitions is necessary to 
accomplish the statutory purposes in the light of the 
process of securities distribution as it exists in the United 
States.  Securities are distributed in this country by a 
complex and sensitive machinery geared to accomplish 
nationwide distribution of large quantities of securities 
with great speed.  Multi-million dollar issues are often 
oversubscribed on the day the securities are made 
available for sale.  This result is accomplished by a 
network of prior informal indications of interest or offers 
to buy between underwriters and dealers and between 
dealers and investors based upon mutual expectations 
that, at the moment when sales may legally be made, 
many prior indications will immediately materialize as 
 
 77. Id. § 5(3), § 77e(c) (2006) (making it unlawful for “any person . . . to offer 
to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus . . . unless a 
registration statement has been filed as to such security” (emphasis added)); see 
also id. § 77l(a) (imposing liability on “[a]ny person who . . . offers or sells a 
security” in violation of provisions of the Act (emphasis added)); id. § 77q 
(regulating those involved in “the offer or sale of any securities or any security-
based swap agreement” against fraudulent interstate transactions (emphasis 
added)). 
 78. Id. § 77e(c). 
 79. 1 HAZEN, supra note 75, § 2.3[1]. 
 80. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).  The complete 
definition is lengthy and will not be reproduced here.  
 81. In re Carl M. Leob, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959). 
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purchases.  It is wholly unrealistic to assume in this 
context that ‘offers’ must take any particular legal form. 
. . . Under the practices existing prior to the enactment of 
the statute in 1933, dealers made blind commitments to 
purchase securities without adequate information, and in 
turn, resold the securities to an equally uninformed 
investing public.  The entire distribution process was often 
stimulated by sales literature designed solely to arouse 
interest in the securities and not to disclose material facts 
about the issuer and its securities.82 
The Commission went on to state that an offer is 
everything that, “even though not couched in terms of an 
express offer, condition[s] the public mind or arouse[s] public 
interest in the particular securities.”83 
While there are exceptions to the broad definition of 
offer,84 the statute demonstrates that Congress determined a 
need to broaden the offer concept definition beyond contract 
law’s definition to adequately protect investors.85  Indeed, by 
including in its offer concept not only advertisements, but 
also solicitations86 and other attempts to dispose, the Security 
Act uses the offer concept more broadly even than § 32 of the 
Lanham Act, which does not cover solicitations.  The Securitie 
Act’s investor protection rationale is analogous to trademark 
law’s consumer protection rationale, thus it is unsurprising 
that both areas of law define the offer concept more broadly 
than does contract law.  Although the Securities Act’s offer 
 
 82. Id. at 848–49 (footnote omitted).  
 83. Id. at 850; see also Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective 
Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3250–56 (1993) (offering examples of pre-filing publicity that 
violated section 5(c)). 
 84. Most notably, is 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2012); see, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra 
note 75, § 2.3[2]; Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous 
Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 462–63 (1989) (discussing 
exceptions, including SEC Rule 135 (17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1988)), which “allow[] 
issuers to announce that they intend to offer securities to be registered under 
the Act if the notice is restricted to certain basic information about the issuer 
and the issue, and states that the offer will be made only by means of a 
prospectus”). 
 85. See, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra note 75, § 2.3[2]; Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, “Testing 
the Waters”—The SEC’S Feet Go from Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 
477–79 (1998) (discussing the broad definition of offer in the 1933 act). 
 86. Solicitations include attempts to commercialize that are distributed less 
widely than advertisements, and can include one-on-one attempts to gain 
business. 
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concept is broader in some respects than the Lanham Act’s, 
the general logic behind the Securities Act’s expansive 
definition of offer parallels that of the Lanham Act: a narrow, 
contract law definition would not adequately protect 
investors. 
C. Endangered Species Act 
In 1973, the United States enacted the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA),87 in large part to fulfill its obligations 
under the newly signed Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).88  The 
ESA seeks to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the 
conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species . . . .”89  As part of its provisions to protect endangered 
species, the ESA prohibits, with certain exceptions, a person 
from “sell[ing] or offer[ing] for sale in interstate or foreign 
commerce” certain endangered species,90 whether the 
animal91 is alive or dead.92  Violators may face civil and 
 
 87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2006). 
 88. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; see also 
Elizabeth R. Beardsley, Poachers with PCs: The United States’ Potential 
Obligations and Ability to Enforce Endangered Wildlife Trading Prohibitions 
against Foreign Traders Who Advertise on eBay, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
1, 3–7 (2006). 
 89. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).  The Supreme Court has interpreted the ESA 
broadly.  See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176–84 (1978) 
(discussing the temporal and legislative history behind enactment of the ESA 
and concluding that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was 
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.  This 
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every 
section of the statute.”). 
 90. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(F).  Numerous other statutes invoke the offer 
concept in an effort to protect animals and rare items.  See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 
668(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to “take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer 
to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import” bald eagles or golden 
eagles); 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (prohibiting, inter alia, “offer[ing] for sale” 
migratory birds); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-390(b) (2012) (forbidding the “[sale], 
exchange, transport, recei[pt] or offer to sell, [of] any archaeological artifact or 
human remains . . . removed from state lands or a state archaeological 
preserve”). 
 91. The statute applies the same prohibitions to plants as well.  16 U.S.C. § 
1538(a)(2). 
 92. Id. § 1532(8) (“The term ‘fish or wildlife’ means any member of the 
animal kingdom . . . and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof, or 
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criminal penalties.93 
Hence, as with the Lanham Act and the 1933 Securities 
Act, the ESA prohibits not only sales of endangered species, 
but also offers for sale.94  Similarly, in using the offer concept 
as a tool to protect endangered animals, the ESA broadens 
the definition of offer from its contract law definition.  
Specifically, while the statute does not define offer, a 
regulation promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service 
pursuant to the statute provides, “[a]n advertisement for the 
sale of endangered wildlife which carries a warning to the 
effect that no sale may be consummated until a permit has 
been obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service shall 
not be considered an offer for sale within the meaning of this 
section.”95 
Because the regulation exempts a specific type of 
advertisement from the definition of offer, by implication all 
other advertisements would be offers.96  A prohibition on most 
advertisements meshes with common sense: if sales of 
endangered animals are not permitted, what business does a 
person have advertising such a transaction?97 
In addition to the regulation, one judicial decision has 
touched on the meaning of offer under the ESA, though 
without much elaboration.  In United States v. Clark,98 the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction of David Clark for, among 
other things, offering for sale a Siberian tiger skin rug.99  
 
the dead body or parts thereof.”). 
 93. See id. § 1540. 
 94. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(F). 
 95. 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(f)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 96. If the statute used offer for sale in the contract law sense, almost no 
advertisements would qualify as offers for sale, thus making this regulation 
largely superfluous.  See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.  There is an 
alternate interpretation of the regulation: the regulation might be read to mean 
that any advertisement that would qualify as an offer to sell under traditional 
contract law principles is not an offer to sell if it includes the required warning.  
But this reading is less plausible in view of the normal meaning of 
advertisement and the very small number of advertisements that qualify as a 
contract law offer. 
 97. Certain sales, e.g., for scientific research, are permissible, provided the 
proper permit is obtained.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).  Thus it makes sense to allow 
advertisement of those potential transactions, which is precisely why the 
regulation allows advertisements containing a caveat that “no sale may be 
consummated until a permit has been obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service.”  50 C.F.R. § 17.21(f)(2). 
 98. 986 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 99. Id. at 67.  Although the rug was not a live animal, the ESA defines 
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Unfortunately, it is unclear from the court’s opinion whether 
the advertisement was specific enough to constitute an offer 
under traditional contract law.  The opinion does not provide 
the specifics of the advertisements, noting only that Clark 
“advertised a Siberian tiger skin rug for sale in the 
Washington Post” and that “[o]ther advertisements in several 
national newspapers did not specify the kind of tiger.”100  It is 
possible that the advertisement could have included specific 
language that included price, who could purchase (e.g., first 
come, first served), and other essential terms so that it would 
qualify as an offer even under traditional contract law.101  
Thus, while one cannot be sure whether the advertisement 
was specific enough to constitute a contract law offer, one can 
at least infer from the lack of discussion about the details of 
the advertisement that the court was untroubled by this 
question. 
It is likely, therefore, that general advertisements would 
come within the ESA’s definition of an offer, which would 
further the ESA’s goal to protect endangered animals.  
Prohibiting only contract law offers but allowing 
advertisements would increase the demand for endangered 
species,102 thus increasing illegal purchases and threatening 
 
endangered wildlife to include the dead bodies or parts of animals.  16 U.S.C. § 
1532(8). 
 100. Clark, 986 F.2d at 67. 
 101. See supra note 29. 
 102. Whether and to what extent advertising increases demand is a matter of 
debate.  See generally K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3 
THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701–44 (M. Armstrong & R. 
Porter eds., 2007) (noting the competing views of the roles and effects of 
advertisements).  While this debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it should 
be noted that where perfect information is not available to consumers, as might 
be expected in markets where advertisements are illegal, advertising may be 
expected to increase demand.  Books and articles discussing advertising and 
demand are legion.  See, e.g., Eliana Garces, The Impact of Behavioral 
Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
145, 148 (2010) (“Neoclassical economics already recognizes the possibility that 
a firm invests in advertisement to increase the demand of its product.”); 
Sherwin Rosen, Advertising, Information, and Product Differentiation, in 
ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION 161 (David G. Tuerck 
ed., 1978).  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has seemed to shift its view on 
whether advertising can be presumed to increase demand.  Compare Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 
(1980) (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for 
electricity.  Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it 
believed that promotion would increase its sales.”), and Posadas de P.R. Assocs. 
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341–42 (1986) (“The Puerto Rico 
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to harm endangered animals.  In addition, widespread 
advertisement of otherwise prohibited sales would tend to 
confuse the public about whether buying the animal is legal 
or not.  Since it is unlikely that the average rug or garment 
purchaser is aware of all the animals covered by the ESA, 
allowing such advertisements might lead innocent consumers 
to violate the law103 and in turn assist sellers in violating the 
law.  The confusion would not only harm the endangered 
animals by increasing trafficking, but also harm purchasers 
ignorant of the law by subjecting them to penalties under the 
ESA. 
D. Criminal Law 
Numerous criminal laws invoke the offer concept by 
prohibiting persons from offering to sell various types of 
contraband.104  Like the other areas of law discussed in this 
Article, many criminal laws expand the offer concept beyond 
its contract law definition.  For example, to stop the issuance 
of false identification cards, Florida and South Carolina laws 
make it “unlawful for any person . . . to offer to sell . . . any 
identification card or document purporting to contain the age 
or date of birth of the person in whose name it was issued” 
unless certain restrictions are met.105  Each statute defines 
 
Legislature obviously believed . . . that advertising of casino gambling . . . would 
serve to increase the demand for the product advertised.  We think the 
legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .”), with Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999) (“While it is no doubt fair to 
assume that more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for 
gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would 
merely channel gamblers to one casino rather than another.”). 
 103. Purchasers might violate the ESA’s prohibitions against importing, 
taking, or receiving endangered animals.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006).  
Further, they may resell the animals unaware of the ESA’s restrictions. 
 104. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-2.2 (2012) (prohibiting any offer to 
sell certain types of bullets); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131N (2012) 
(prohibiting any offer to sell certain dangerous weapons that do not resemble 
traditional guns); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224b (2012) (prohibiting any offer to 
sell a short-barreled shotgun or rifle); WIS. STAT. § 941.28(2) (2011) (same); see 
also Barton Deiters, ‘Joke Ad’ on eBay Offering Tot for Sale Could Land 
Prankster in Prison for More Than Two Years, MLIVE.COM (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2011/07/joke_ad_on_ebay_offe
ring_tot_f.html (detailing criminal charges brought against a woman for placing 
an advertisement on eBay to sell her two-year old cousin).  Recall also that the 
Endangered Species Act carries the possibility of criminal sanctions.  See supra 
notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 105. FLA. STAT. § 877.18(1) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-450(1) (2011). 
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offer to sell to “include[] every inducement, solicitation, 
attempt,” or advertisement by “print[] or media” “to 
encourage a person to purchase an identification card.”106  
Thus, even though advertisements and other promotions 
would not meet the contract law definition of an offer, they 
would run afoul of these laws. 
Not all statutes define “offer,” however, and few, if any, 
cases litigate the issue.  While research revealed no United 
States cases on the subject, in an English case from 1961, 
Fisher v. Bell,107 the government prosecuted Bell for violating 
a statute prohibiting the offer for sale of a switchblade 
knife.108  Bell had displayed in his store window a switchblade 
knife with a tag behind it reading “Ejector knife — 4s.”109  
With much reservation, the court held that exhibiting the 
knife with the tag did not violate the statute because it was 
not an offer for sale under traditional contract law; it was 
“merely an invitation to treat.”110  Yet the court noted, 
…I think most lay people, and indeed, I myself when I 
first read the papers, would be inclined to the view that to 
say that if a knife was displayed in a window like that 
with a price attached to it was not offering it for sale was 
just nonsense.111 
Noting that other statutes prohibited not only offering for 
sale, but also exposing for sale or similar broad language to 
cover invitations to treat, the court assumed that Parliament 
knew how to draft statutes to cover activities broader than 
contract law offers.112  Finally, the court also stated that “even 
if this—and I am by no means saying it is—is a casus omissus 
it is not for this court to supply the omission.”113  Indeed, 
Parliament soon supplied the omission by amending the 
statute to also subject to prosecution anybody who “expose[d] 
or has in his possession for the purposes of sale” a 
switchblade.114 
 
 106. FLA. STAT. § 877.18(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-450(3). 
 107. [1961] 1 Q.B. 394. (Eng.) 
 108. Id. at 395. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 399. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  See infra notes 213–22 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of this statutory interpretation technique. 
 113. Fisher, [1961] 1 Q.B. at 400. 
 114. Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1961; 1961 c. 22 (10 Eliz 2).  
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Fisher v. Bell thus raises a question: how should U.S. 
courts interpret criminal laws that prohibit offers to sell 
dangerous weapons (or other contraband) when the statute 
does not define offer and does not explicitly prohibit other 
activities such as advertisements? 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the 
potential constructions of the offer concept as it appears in 
each criminal statute, a few observations are offered.115  To 
construe a statute, courts first look to whether the statute 
itself defines the term at issue.  In some instances, courts 
may consult the legislative history.116  Further, since the word 
“offer” has a generally accepted common law meaning in the 
law of contracts, one canon of statutory construction inserts a 
presumption that the common law meaning should prevail117 
(this was the Fisher v. Bell rationale).  In criminal statutes, 
the rule of lenity dictates that courts should interpret 
“ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant” so 
that people are not unfairly subject to criminal penalties.118  
 
Parliament’s reversal of Fisher demonstrates the weakness of the interpretative 
cannon that courts should presume common law terms have their common law 
meaning even when used in ways dramatically different from their common law 
origin. 
 115. See infra Section III.B for additional discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the canons of statutory interpretation. 
 116. Reviewing each criminal statute’s history is beyond this Article’s scope.  
It should be noted that a textualist-oriented judge would be relatively more 
reluctant to consult legislative history, but might do so if the statute is 
ambiguous (and whether a statute is ambiguous likewise may depend on the 
particular judge reviewing it). 
 117. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011); 
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here 
a common-law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given 
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply 
except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ”  (citations omitted) 
(quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (construing the 
term employee in the Copyright Act in view of traditional common law agency 
principles). 
 118. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–647, § 2509, 104 Stat. 4789, 
4863 (1990); see also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); Ratzlaf 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148–49 (1994), superseded by statute, Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, Pub. 
L. No. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994).  Closely related is the principle of 
legality, which requires that conduct must be criminalized in order to be 
punishable.  Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita 
Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1320 (1995). 
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Applying the rule of lenity in the offer to sell context suggests 
a narrow, contract law definition of “offer,” which would 
exclude advertisements and other promotions. 
Whatever the merits of the various canons of statutory 
construction,119 when considering the policies behind these 
criminal statutes (e.g., to prevent the spread of contraband), 
it strains reason to believe that one who merely advertises or 
otherwise commercially promotes a prohibited dangerous 
weapon would escape prosecution simply because the 
advertisement did not amount to a contract law offer.  As 
with the advertisement of endangered species by traffickers 
discussed in the immediately preceding subsection, 
advertisement of contraband serves no legitimate purpose 
since the underlying sale is illegal.  Hence, a broader 
definition of “offer” under criminal laws comports with the 
rationale of deterring certain undesirable behaviors and more 
fully protecting society against the harms associated 
therewith. 
E. Summary 
The four very different areas of the law discussed above 
demonstrate the extent to which the law is suffused with the 
offer concept.  Unlike contract law, where the offer concept 
helps modulate contract formation, many other areas of the 
law use the offer concept to help control certain undesirable 
behaviors.  In accordance with its new policy role in each area 
of the law, the offer concept often takes on a new definition 
consonant with its purpose.  In some cases, legislatures 
provide a specific definition, in others agencies or courts 
provide definitional details. 
Having surveyed several examples of the offer concept’s 
use in the law, this Article now turns to consider patent law’s 
relatively recent use of the offer concept to help regulate 
infringement.  The Article uses patent law as a case study for 
an in-depth analysis of the offer concept’s policy role and its 
optimal definition in light of that role. 
 
 
 119. See infra note 170 for criticisms of the canons. 
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III. A CASE STUDY: THE OFFER CONCEPT AS A POLICY TOOL IN 
PATENT LAW 
Under authority from the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
designed patent laws to promote advances in technology 
through the grant of exclusive rights to inventions.120  Patent 
law encourages innovation in several ways.  First, the grant 
of exclusive rights121 to inventions incentivizes invention and 
disclosure of inventions by allowing inventors to recoup their 
up-front research and development costs, whereas without 
exclusivity competitors might easily duplicate the invention 
without having to incur the same costs.122  Additionally, the 
grant of exclusive rights is believed to induce firms to invest 
in commercial exploitation of innovation, which is necessary 
to bring inventions to the marketplace.123  Patents have also 
been said to encourage competitors to design around existing 
patents, thereby generating improvements upon existing 
technology and new ways to accomplish the same result.124 
While the above-mentioned instrumentalist/utilitarian 
justifications of the patent system have recently dominated 
American patent law,125 others assert natural rights-based (or 
 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the right “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”). 
 121. Among other rights, a United States patent confers the exclusive right 
to make, use, offer to sell, and sell the invention set forth in the patent claims.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 122. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–30 
(1989); Lucas Osborn, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should 
Not Exclude the Patent System, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 325, 331 (2008). 
 123. E.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–12 (2001); Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–
77 (1977). 
 124. F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. 
SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 71 (5th ed. 2011). 
 125. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent 
laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited 
period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts.”); Julie E. 
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (describing the patent system’s central 
task as utilitarian in nature); Kieff, supra note 123, at 697–98 (“Although 
rights-based theories do influence debates about intellectual property theory in 
general, the consensus among those studying the American patent system is to 
focus on utilitarian approaches.”);  see Kitch, supra note 123, at 265–71 
(describing a utilitarian prospect theory of patents). 
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deontological) justifications.  The primary natural rights 
argument in patent law is usually based on an extrapolation 
of the Lockean labor-desert theory under which inventors 
should be awarded patents based on the labor expended or 
the value added to society.126  A second major strand of 
natural rights theory is based on a personhood theory, 
typically derived from a Hegelian actualization theory, in 
which intellectual property serves as an extension of the 
author’s personality.127  As applied to patent law, the labor-
desert theory is typically accepted as a superior justification 
than the personhood theory since it is more intuitive to think 
of a copyrighted poem being an extension of one’s personality 
than a patented microchip.128 
With these background justifications for patent law in 
mind, this Article will consider the offer concept’s use as a 
tool to help regulate patent infringement.  It should be noted 
that American patent law has not always used the offer 
concept to regulate infringement.129  Although from its 
beginnings American law has given the patent holder the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention in the 
United States,130 American patent law did not make an 
 
 126. E.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 
1533, 1540–83 (1993); see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988). 
 127. E.g., Hughes, supra note 126, at 330–65;  see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
 128. Hughes, supra note 126, at 341–42; see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (2007).  But see Mark A. 
Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 
880 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996), noting the 
American romantic view of inventors); Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen, 
What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm Innovation, 56 MGMT. SCI. 
2134 (2010). 
 129. Acts of direct infringement include the unauthorized making, using, 
selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United States or importing 
of a patented invention into the United States during the term of the patent.  35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  For a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show 
that every element (or its substantial equivalent) listed in a patent’s claim is 
present in the accused device.  See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
 130. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 §1 (repealed 1793) 
(granting the “sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, 
using and vending to others” the invention); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1952) (amended 
1996) (providing that any unauthorized making, using, or selling of a patented 
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unauthorized offer to sell an act of infringement until the 
mid-1990s.131  As part of the international harmonization of 
intellectual property laws under the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement,132 in 1994 Congress 
added a provision to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) making an offer to sell 
infringing technology an independent act of patent 
infringement.133  Before this amendment, a mere offer to sell 
would not infringe a patent’s claims, whereas an actual sale 
would.134  Despite the radical change in the law adding 
infringement for an offer to sell, Congress gave almost no 
instruction about the intent or meaning of the new invocation 
of the offer concept.135 
Given that the offer concept is available as a tool to 
regulate patent infringement in the United States, the 
remainder of this section analyzes that tool.  The first 
subsection analyzes the offer concept in patent law strictly 
from a policy perspective and provides a normative assertion 
for its proper scope.  An analysis of the statutory text and 
context is reserved for the second subsection.136 
 
 
invention is an act of infringement). 
 131. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 132. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
Annex 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), art. 28, § 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197  
(“Article 28 . . . A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
. . . to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: . . . 
offering for sale”). 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever . . . offers to sell . . . within the 
United States . . . any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).  The 
statute became effective January 1, 1996.  See also Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. § 101(d)(15) (1994) (approving TRIPS). 
 134. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994); Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 
F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that § 271 “by itself, cannot be 
interpreted to cover acts other than an actual making, using or selling of the 
patented invention”). 
 135. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“Unfortunately, other than stating that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only 
those offers ‘in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the 
patent,’ Congress offered no other guidance as to the meaning of the phrase. . . . 
[T]he legislative history of the statute offers little additional insight.” (citation 
omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (Supp. 1997))). 
 136. While this order of analysis (policy first, statute second) may be the 
reverse of what a person engaged in statutory construction might follow, this 
Article is concerned with what the offer concept’s role should be as well as what 
its role is. 
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A. The Optimal Scope of Patent Law’s Offer Concept in View 
of its Underlying Policies 
The scope of patent law’s offer concept could fall 
anywhere on a spectrum from a narrow, contract law 
definition to a far broader definition that includes almost any 
communication of an intent to commercialize.  One can 
identify several points of interest along the spectrum, such as 
the following, listed in order from narrowest to broadest: 
Contract Law Definition: While various permutations 
exist, the definition in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS suffices: an offer is a “manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify 
another person in understanding that his assent to that 
bargain is invited and will conclude it.”137 
Advertisements: Moving toward a broader definition, the 
offer concept could include not only contract law offers, but 
also advertisements, which can be loosely defined as 
widespread communication through the Internet or print 
or broadcast media designed to attract commercial 
interest.138 
Promotions: This category includes commercializing 
activities that are not as widely or formally distributed as 
traditional advertising, such as displays at trade shows, 
face-to-face solicitations (such as sales presentations to 
buyers), price lists, and circular letters.139 
Determining where on this spectrum patent law’s offer 
concept should fall requires a consideration of the purposes 
that the offer concept serves in section 271(a) of the Patent 
Act. 
1. The Policy of Preventing Third Parties from Harming 
Patentees by Generating Interest in an Infringing 
Product 
The Federal Circuit has primarily discussed a single 
objective behind the offer concept in section 271(a).  In its 
 
 137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 138. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 25 (4th ed. 2000) (defining advertisement as “[a] notice, such as a 
poster or a paid announcement in the print, broadcast, or electronic media, 
designed to attract public attention or patronage”). 
 139. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions 
between advertising and promotion). 
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first case interpreting the language the court stated that 
“[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to § 271(a) was 
to prevent . . . [a competitor from] generating interest in a 
potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of 
the rightful patentee.”140  This policy has been affirmed by 
subsequent decisions, and recently the court referred to it as 
the policy, not just a policy (though this may have been an 
instance of unintentionally loose language).141  Similarly, the 
leading patent treatise emphasizes this policy.142 
i. Comparison to Contract Law 
Assuming patent law’s offer concept primarily serves to 
prevent improper commercialization that harms the patentee, 
one can gain insight into its optimal scope by comparing this 
policy rationale to the policies behind other uses of the offer 
concept.  As a first area of comparison, recall that the offer 
concept in contract law is governed in large part by a policy to 
strengthen freedom from contract and preserve individual 
autonomy.143  To accomplish this policy, contract law creates 
friction between the offeror and offeree by setting the bar for 
an offer relatively high—it must put the power of acceptance 
into the offeree, and thus excludes most advertisements and 
other promotions.144 
But contract law’s focus on freedom from contract and the 
offeror’s and offeree’s autonomy bears little relationship to 
 
 140. 3D Sys. v. Aarotech Labs. Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 141. Compare MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon 
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting the statement in 3D Sys. 
that “ ‘[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to section 271(a) was to 
prevent . . . generating interest in a potential infringing product to the 
commercial detriment of the rightful patentee’ ”  (emphasis added)), with 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The underlying purpose of holding 
someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to prevent ‘generating 
interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the 
rightful patentee.’ ”  (emphasis added) (quoting 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379)).  
Nothing in the Transocean decision indicates this shift from a to the was 
intentional. 
 142. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[5][g], at 16–104 
(Matthew Bender 2010) (“[T]he policy underlying a patentee’s statutory right to 
exclude unauthorized sales and offers to sell [is] to prevent others from deriving 
commercial advantage from the invention without compensating the patent 
owner.”). 
 143. See supra Part I. 
 144. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
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the patent infringement context.  While in traditional 
contract law an offer must be met with an acceptance to 
invoke state oversight of (and potential imposition on) private 
ordering,145 in patent law the government has already 
granted the patentee the power of exclusivity against 
competitors, and the infringer does not escape liability based 
on ignorance of the patent.146  Thus, in the patent context, 
unlike in the contract context, the offer does not lead to the 
law creating completely new rights and obligations between 
two parties, but rather is compensating a patentee based on 
its pre-existing right of exclusivity. 
Further, unlike contract law where the focus is largely on 
the effect of an offer on the offeree, in patent law the focus 
shifts in large part to the effect of the offer on the patentee.  
While patent law retains a modicum of focus on the offeree in 
that the offer must generate an offeree’s commercial interest 
in the infringing product,147 piquing an audience’s commercial 
interest is a lower standard than contract law’s insistence 
that the offeree understand she can conclude the bargain 
with a simple acceptance.  Indeed, activities such as 
advertisements and other promotions can generate interest in 
an infringing product and harm the patentee even though 
they are not contract law offers. 
Initially, it may seem that an offer to sell an infringing 
product, if not eventually consummated by a sale, would not 
harm the patentee.  Yet a competitor’s advertisement or 
promotion of an infringing product at a lower price148 than the 
patentee charges will potentially cause price erosion, as the 
patentee must adjust its price to compete with the infringer 
and/or forgo future price increases.149  This harm is most 
 
 145. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 146. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant 
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States  
. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 147. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 148. Indeed, even if a price is not mentioned, the mere appearance of 
competition could cause downward price pressure. 
 149. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale:” Assessing Patent Infringement for 
Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar 
and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 791–92 (2003)); 
David Bohrer et al., The Shifting Sands of Price Erosion: Price Erosion 
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apparent and direct where the patentee (1) is practicing the 
invention150 and (2) has market power to charge a premium 
for the patented product (i.e., there are no adequate non-
infringing alternatives).151  Where the patentee is not 
practicing the invention, she is still entitled to a reasonable 
royalty,152 which must have some value, however small, since 
the infringer obviously valued the right to offer the product 
for sale as evidenced by its actual offer. 
Because price erosion, which harms the patentee, can 
result from commercializing activities that fall short of a 
contract law offer, patent law’s offer concept should be 
defined to include commercializing activities to the extent 
they have the ability to affect price erosion.153  The definition 
should include advertising since it is the activity most likely 
to cause price erosion.  Indeed, advertising, which is by 
definition widespread, is more likely to cause price erosion 
than isolated contract law offers.  Further, the definition 
should include promotions that do not qualify as formal 
advertising, since promotional activities such as circular 
letters and person-to-person solicitations are capable of 
causing price erosion. 
Of course, not all advertisements or promotional 
activities will cause price erosion, as where they do not reach 
a significant portion of the market.  Thus, one might be 
tempted to exclude them from patent law’s offer concept.  But 
 
Damages Shift by Tens of Millions of Dollars Depending Upon the Admissibility 
of Pre-Notice Eroded Prices, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 723 
(2009); Robert S. Frank, Jr. & Denise W. DeFranco, Patent Infringement 
Damages: A Brief Summary, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 281, 287–88 (2000). 
 150. Practicing the invention refers to a patentee that either sells the product 
himself or has others (e.g., licensees) sell on his behalf.  If the patentee is not 
practicing the invention, price fluctuations will not harm him. 
 151. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 792.  In the case of a market with 
noninfringing alternatives (e.g., a nail as a substitute for a patented screw), a 
patentee will tend to have market power and the ability to charge a premium 
until an infringing offer lessens this power.  Where the noninfringing 
alternative is a perfect substitute (i.e., it performs as well as or better than the 
patented product at a similar or lower price), the patentee will have no market 
power regardless of infringing offers (assuming a well-functioning market) and 
price erosion will not be a cognizable harm. 
 152. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) mandates a minimum damage award of a 
reasonable royalty, calculated based on a hypothetical contractual negotiation 
that might have taken place between the patentee and the infringer at a time 
just before infringement occurred.  See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 
1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 153. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 788–800. 
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excluding these commercializing activities would be under-
inclusive: the commercializing activities will affect the 
market price at least some of the time, but a per se exclusion 
would render the patent holder unable to recover even where 
it can prove damages.  Instead, the better option is to include 
these commercializing activities within the offer concept.154  
While the harm from price erosion may at times be small or 
difficult to prove (and in fact may not exist at all), this 
concern is more properly addressed by requiring the patent 
holder to prove its damages with reasonable certainty.155 
In sum, a comparison of contract law’s policies 
underlying its offer concept to patent law’s policy of 
preventing detrimental commercial interest in infringing 
products suggests that the patent law offer concept should be 
broader than the contract law concept. 
ii. Comparison to Other Areas of the Law 
To further inform the proper scope of patent law’s offer 
concept, one can compare the policies behind other uses of the 
offer concept to patent law’s policy of preventing third parties 
from generating commercial interest in infringing products to 
the patentee’s detriment. 
The Lanham Act’s policy of protecting a trademark 
owner’s investment in high quality goods provides 
particularly interesting parallels to infringement for an offer 
 
 154. Courts should not, however, make offers to buy or mere inquiries by 
buyers acts of infringement because they would not commercially harm the 
patentee—they would, if anything, be likely to drive up the price of the patented 
goods by indicating an increase in demand, not supply.  Thus, inquiries by 
buyers are excluded from the terms solicitations and other promotional 
activities as used herein. 
 155. Even formal contract law offers will not always result in provable price 
erosion.  Patent damages are governed primarily by 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  
One option would be to craft a detailed definition of the offer concept that would 
only include those promotions likely to cause price erosion (e.g., by correlating it 
to how widely the promotional activities are distributed compared to the 
purchasing audience).  On the other hand, finely tuning the definition will be 
difficult ex ante.  If the definition of an offer encompasses most promotional 
activities, the cost of fine tuning (i.e., determining whether there is actual 
damage) shifts to each patentee.  Allowing cases of price erosion to reach a fact 
finder will increase litigation costs, but presumably a patent holder would only 
pursue damages if it had some reasonable likelihood of success; otherwise it 
would be wasting its money on its own litigation expenses.  In addition, a patent 
holder could pursue injunctive relief.  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).  Courts can 
exercise their equitable discretion in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.  
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
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to sell in patent law.  In both cases, the right holder 
(trademark or patent) is harmed by a competitor’s activity (an 
advertisement) that is directed toward buyers.  In both cases, 
a mere advertisement, even if not followed by a formal offer 
or sale, may be enough to harm the right holder.  Thus, the 
parallels between the goals of § 32 of the Lanham Act and  
§ 271(a) of the Patent Act suggest that patent law’s offer 
concept should mirror the Lanham Act’s by including at least 
advertisements in its definition. 
Further, patent law’s policy against improper generation 
of commercial interest markedly resembles the Securities 
Act’s recognition that any activity that “arouses public 
interest”156 in securities can harm investors.  While patent 
law’s focus rests primarily on the patentee as opposed to the 
Securities Act’s focus on investors, both laws concern the 
same essential problem, i.e., an entity improperly arousing or 
generating interest in a thing being commercialized.  The 
Securities Act’s recognition that offers to sell, advertisements, 
and even smaller-scale solicitations can generate public 
interest157 suggests a broad scope for patent law’s offer 
concept. 
Similarly, the Endangered Species Act provides an 
interesting comparison to the Patent Act.  Both statutes 
include a prohibition against offers to sell without defining 
the term and both statutes were enacted to comply with 
international agreements.158  The ESA’s offer concept does not 
focus on whether the offeree can conclude the bargain (the 
contract law focus).  Rather, it focuses on the potential harm 
a third party (an endangered species) may incur from the 
commercialization of the endangered species.159  Because 
advertisements would tend to increase illegal animal 
trafficking, the ESA defines offers to include most 
advertisements.160  The ESA’s shift of focus from the offeree to 
the effect on external entity loosely mirrors the Patent Act’s 
focus on preventing harm to the patent holder.  Similarly, the 
 
 156. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra Part II.C (discussing the ESA).  Interpretations of offer to sell 
in the ESA have not discussed the ESA’s international heritage.  As to the 
potential impact of the Patent Act’s international character on interpretation of 
offer to sell, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 159. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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ESA’s recognition that advertising will affect animal 
trafficking markets and harm endangered species suggests 
that patent law’s offer concept should be defined to include 
advertising since advertising can affect the market for the 
patented technology and harm the patentee. 
2. Additional Policies Behind Making an Offer to Sell an 
Act of Patent Infringement 
Courts have posited additional rationales for including 
offer to sell as an act of infringement.  Most broadly, the 
Federal Circuit noted that Congress added the language to 
strengthen patent holders’ protections under § 271.161  At 
least one court described the purpose of adding offer to sell 
was to allow a patentee to sue at an earlier time.162  The court 
stated that § 271(i)’s definition of an offer to sell as “ ‘that in 
which the sale will occur before the expiration of the patent’  
. . . makes it clear that Congress intended the ‘offer to sell’ 
language to push back the point in time at which the 
competitor’s activity is an act of infringement.”163  Each of 
these purposes is accurate, but each is unhelpful in 
pinpointing which activities should count as an offer to sell, 
since any definition would strengthen patent holders’ rights 
and allow an earlier suit164 compared to infringement for a 
 
 161. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (citing General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (GATT): Intellectual 
Property Provisions: Hearings on H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. 
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Judiciary 
Comm. and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong. 124 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and 
Trademarks) (stating that the amendments “ ‘add to the rights of the patent 
owner’ ” ). 
 162. Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 
613, 623 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“The language of the statute and the cases make it 
clear that expanding the list of infringing activities in sections 271(a) . . . 
protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing activity.  The patent 
holder no longer has to wait for an actual infringing sale before filing suit.”). 
 163. Id. at 624 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2000)). 
 164. Regarding the Quality Tubing court’s emphasis on 271(i)’s timing 
provision, note that advertisements and individual solicitations may 
contemplate sales that will occur before the patent’s expiration.  One could 
interpret § 271(i)’s requirement to mean that the offer must specify a projected 
completion date or else it does not infringe.  Even this stringent interpretation 
would be both under- and over-inclusive: some contract law offers would not 
infringe (if the offers did not specify a completion date) and some advertising 
and solicitations would infringe (e.g., an advertisement good for one week only). 
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completed sale. 
Further, applying a labor-desert theory165 to the offer 
concept, one could argue that a third party should not be 
permitted to trespass upon the inventor’s justly-secured 
patent right.  On this theory, the inventor’s provision of value 
to society via her invention results in her natural right to a 
patent, and that right should not be invaded by another’s 
offering to sell the invention.  This argument would lead to a 
broadly defined offer concept because the inventor’s natural 
right to the patent should be protected against unjustified 
trespass, regardless of whether the invasion causes economic 
harm to the patentee. 
Moreover, the offer concept may play a role in buyer166 
protection.  Though this policy was not likely at the forefront 
of the change to § 271(a), the prohibition on offers to sell 
infringing technology adds a layer of protection to purchasers 
of patented technology.  A purchaser of infringing technology, 
even if ignorant of the infringement, will become an infringer 
if it uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the purchased 
technology within the United States.167  Hence, to the extent a 
broad offer concept will lead to less commercialization of 
infringing technology, it can in turn protect innocent 
purchasers from future liability for infringement. 
Finally, the Federal Circuit has stated that Congress 
added infringement for an offer to sell to harmonize U.S. 
patent law with that of the international community.168  
While TRIPS certainly intended to harmonize the broad 
contours of intellectual property law (including patent law), 
the extent to which TRIPS intended detailed harmonization 
is debated.169  In any event, this Article reserves a discussion 
 
 165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 166. The word buyer is used instead of consumer to reflect the fact that many 
purchasers of patented technology are businesses rather than individual 
consumers. 
 167. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 168. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[W]e must recognize one of the agreements’ declared purposes: 
harmonizing worldwide patent law.” (citing Lisa B. Martin & Susan L. Amster, 
International Intellectual Property Protections in the New GATT Accord, 2 J. 
PROPRIETARY RTS. 9, 9 (1993))); see also Hearings, supra note 161 (“With its 
signing in Marrakech, we established international standards for the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property that were unthinkable only a decade 
ago.”). 
 169. See infra notes 207–10 and accompanying text. 
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of the consequences of TRIPS’ international character for 
Section III.B.2 below. 
B. The Scope of Patent Law’s Offer Concept in View of the 
Canons of Statutory Construction 
While the preceding subsection focused solely on policy 
analysis, this subsection will analyze the meaning of patent 
law’s offer concept in light of the canons of statutory 
construction.  This analysis will not be exhaustive, but will 
discuss the more salient interpretive issues.  Courts and 
scholars perpetually debate the rules (and whether rules 
exist) for statutory construction,170 with strict textualists 
refusing to go beyond the statutory language171 and the 
liberal purposivist looking at legislative history, context, and 
policy.172  Others (most famously Karl Llewellyn) criticize the 
idea that statutory canons can assist in an objective statutory 
construction.173  This Article does not enter that debate, and 
instead analyzes the language, history, context, and policy174 
 
 170. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63–64 (1994); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 
(1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 
78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 
(2002). 
 171. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Although it is true that the Court in recent times has [allowed 
legislative history to sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind an 
ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a 
statute is clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the absence of a 
patent absurdity.”). 
 172. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) 
(“As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of 
these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–03 (1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 863, 885 (1930). 
 174. This Article analyzed the policies undergirding the offer concept in the 
preceding Part III.A.  The Supreme Court has looked at policy to guide its 
decisions in patent cases.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) 
(“Since we find no specific assistance in the legislative materials underlying § 
101, we are remitted to an analysis of the problem in light of the general intent 
of Congress, the purposes of the patent system, and the implications of a 
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without commenting on the appropriateness or inherent 
weight that each source carries. 
1. The Meaning of “Offer to Sell” in View of the Statute’s 
Text 
An oft-cited rule of statutory construction instructs 
courts to start with the words of the statute.175  Of course, 
starting with the words does not necessarily mean ending 
with the words.  Judges leaning toward stricter textualism 
would say that if the text’s meaning is clear, courts “must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”176  Other judges might say only that the text’s 
meaning should be given priority in construction.177  If judges 
agree to start with the words, an additional rule of statutory 
construction directs that Congress should be presumed to 
have intended words to carry their ordinary meaning.178  
Perhaps inevitably, judges differ widely regarding whether, 
and how to determine whether, a set of words has an ordinary 
meaning and is unambiguous.  If the text’s meaning is not 
clear, most judges would resort to other sources for 
interpretation, including other words of the statute and the 
legislative history.179 
i. The Meaning of “Offer to Sell” in the Law in 1994 
The words offer to sell in 38 U.S.C. § 271(a) arguably do 
not have a plain and ordinary meaning, as demonstrated by 
the various ways Congress has defined the phrase180 and the 
disparity between the traditional contract law meaning 
 
decision one way or the other.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 
(1989) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its 
language.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  Note that the Chevron court discusses whether the intent 
is clear, not necessarily the text. 
 177. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1126, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“[A] statute’s plain meaning should be given priority in its construction.”). 
 178. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 (2011). 
 179. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“ ‘[W]e look first to the 
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language 
is unclear.’ ”  (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984))). 
 180. See supra Part II (analyzing the offer concept as used in various areas of 
the law). 
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compared to the lay-person’s understanding.181  Where the 
meaning of a text is not plain, other rules of construction may 
be used. 
One such rule directs that since the phrase “offer to sell” 
is a common law term, courts “assume the ‘term . . . comes 
with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing 
another way.’ ” 182 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i, the Supreme Court 
recently applied this rule of construction in the patent context 
to support the rationale that the directive that a patent shall 
be presumed valid means it can only be invalidated by clear 
and convincing evidence.183  The court noted that over 100 
years of patent decisions had settled on a meaning of 
presumed valid, and thus Congress should be presumed to 
have intended the settled meaning of that phrase when it 
used it in the 1952 Patent Act.184 
If one assumes that the common law meaning of “offer to 
sell” refers to its meaning in the common law of contracts, 
then applying this rule to § 271(a) suggests that the definition 
of “offer to sell” would exclude most advertisements and 
promotions, unless there is anything pointing another way.185  
Starting with the remaining text in § 271, nothing appears to 
alter the common law definition, other than § 271(i)’s 
requirement that the offer be one for which the sale would not 
occur after the expiration of the patent at issue.186  There is, 
 
 181. See supra note 24.  The Federal Circuit considers the phrase offer to sell 
in § 271(a) to be ambiguous.  See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 
1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (consulting the legislative history behind § 271(a) 
after stating that “[w]hen the language of a statute fails to provide clear and 
unambiguous direction, we may turn to the statute’s legislative history”). 
 182. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007)); accord Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730, 739 (“It is, however, well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses 
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’ ” ); see also supra note 117. 
 183. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2245–48. 
 184. See id. at 2245–47. 
 185. There is disagreement whether the “anything pointing the other way” 
must come from the statute itself or may also include the legislative history or 
extrinsic considerations.  See id. at 2249 n.8 (“For those of us for whom it is 
relevant, the legislative history of § 282 provides additional evidence that 
Congress meant to codify the judge-made presumption of validity, not to set 
forth a new presumption of its own making.” (emphasis added)). 
 186. 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2006).  While the phrase offer to sell appears in other 
sections of the patent statutes, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), Congress inserted the 
phrase in those sections at the same time as adding it to § 271, and these 
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however, a notable difference between the use of “offer to sell” 
in § 271(a) and the term presumed valid discussed in 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i.  Specifically, the term “presumed valid” 
had accumulated a settled meaning in patent cases before its 
use in the patent statute, whereas the term offer to sell as 
applied to infringement187 had not been used in patent cases 
before it was added to § 271.  Thus, any presumption would 
seem to apply with stronger force in the Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
case. 
Moreover, the canon that the common law meaning 
should be presumed is based on an assumption that a term 
has a single meaning in the law.  But when a term has 
evolved new and different meanings over time or in certain 
areas of the law, the presumption must take account of those 
meanings.  The Supreme Court demonstrated this flexible 
approach in Perrin v. United States,188 a case interpreting 
whether the term “bribery” in the Travel Act was limited to 
inducement of public officials, or whether it also included 
inducement of private employees.189  The Perrin Court noted 
that, at early common law, the term “bribery” only applied to 
the corruption of judges or other public officials.190  But the 
Court stated that the meaning that mattered for statutory 
construction purposes was its meaning in 1961, when 
Congress enacted the Travel Act.191  The Perrin Court decided 
that the term bribery was broader than its traditional 
common law meaning because “by the time the Travel Act 
was enacted in 1961, federal and state statutes had extended 
the term bribery well beyond its common law meaning.”192 
Applying the Perrin Court’s logic to the phrase “offer to 
sell” in § 271(a) suggests a broader meaning than the contract 
law definition.  Part II of this Article examined numerous 
statutes (all enacted before offer to sell was added § 271(a))193 
that used the term “offer to sell” in a broader way than its 
 
appearances do not further inform the meaning. 
 187. As discussed below in Part III.B.1.ii, the phrase offer to sell had been 
used in cases concerning § 102(b) of the Patent Act. 
 188. 444 U.S. 37 (1979). 
 189. Id. at 38–41. 
 190. Id. at 43. 
 191. Id. at 42. 
 192. Id. at 43. 
 193. Recall that § 271(a) was amended in 1994 to include liability for an offer 
to sell. 
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contract law meaning.  Thus, just as federal and state 
statutes had broadened the term bribery by the time of the 
Travel Act’s enhancement in 1961, so had federal and state 
statutes broadened the term offer to sell by the time of  
§ 271(a)’s amendment in 1994.194  Hence, courts should 
presume that Congress intended the broader meaning of 
“offer to sell” to apply to § 271(a). 
ii. The Meaning of “On Sale” in Patent Law in 1994 
In addition to the statutes discussed in Part II, judicial 
treatment in 1994 of the term on sale in § 102(b)195 of the 
Patent Act recommends a meaning of “offer to sell” that is 
broader than the contract law definition.  Section 102(b) 
provides that an inventor cannot obtain a patent if “the 
invention was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.”196  Thus, if the inventor puts her invention on sale, 
she must apply for a patent within one year or else she will be 
barred from obtaining a patent.  Courts have recognized 
several policies underlying the § 102(b) on-sale bar, including 
(1) preventing inventors from commercializing their 
inventions while delaying applying for a patent, (2) reluctance 
to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from 
public use, (3) encouraging prompt and widespread disclosure 
of inventions to the public, and (4) giving investors a 
reasonable period to discern the potential value of an 
invention.197 
The phrase “on sale” is arguably similar enough to “offer 
to sell” to inform its meaning.198  While one might argue that 
 
 194. See supra Part II. 
 195. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).  See infra note 196 (discussing 2011 
amendments to § 102(b)). 
 196. § 102(b) (emphasis added).  Note that the America Invents Act will 
retain the on sale verbiage in what will be the new §102(a)(1).  Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 3(b) (enacted Sept. 16, 
2011).  The new § 102 will become effective eighteen months after enactment, 
i.e., March 16, 2013.  Id. at § 3(n). 
 197. E.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (listing policies underlying the on-sale bar); see also Pfaff v. Wells 
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998). 
 198. Further, the on-sale bar’s policy against allowing inventors to 
commercialize their inventions while delaying a patent application recalls § 
271(a)’s policy of preventing a competitor from commercializing infringing 
technology to the commercial harm of the patentee. 
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different phrases should be presumed to have different (but 
perhaps overlapping) meanings, it is also argued that a 
similar term within a statute can inform construction of a 
related term.199  Assuming without deciding that § 102(b) can 
help construe § 271(a),200 this Article briefly considers the 
meaning of on sale under § 102(b). 
When Congress amended § 271(a) in 1994, courts 
interpreted the phrase “on sale” in § 102(b) of the Patent Act 
as referring to an “offer to sell,” but used the phrase offer to 
sell to mean something broader than the contract law 
meaning.201  Specifically, during and before 1994, the Federal 
Circuit understood that an item would be considered on sale 
under § 102(b) when it was subject to a definite offer to sell, 
but that a definite offer to sell could be shown “by a patentee’s 
commercial activity which does not rise to the level of a 
formal ‘offer’ under contract law principles.”202  Thus, at the 
time Congress used the phrase “offer to sell” in § 271(a), 
Federal Circuit decisions used that phrase as synonymous 
with “on sale” and interpreted both phrases as including 
advertisements and price quotes.203  This supports the notion 
 
 199. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 
(1999). 
 200. The Federal Circuit has equivocated somewhat on the extent to which 
102(b)’s on-sale bar should influence § 271(a).  Compare 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 
1379 n.4 (stating that because the policies governing the two sections have “no 
resonance” with each other, the court “decline[s] to import the authority 
construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) into the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a) 
. . . . Thus, ‘offer to sell’ under § 271 cannot be treated as equivalent to ‘on sale’ 
under § 102(b).”), with Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 
1254 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the policies behind the two sections differ, 
while stating that “the analysis of an ‘offer to sell’ under § 271(a) is consistent 
with the [Supreme] Court’s analysis in Pfaff of § 102(b)”). 
 201. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[A] 
definite offer to sell is an essential requirement of the on-sale bar . . . [but the] 
requirement of a definite offer excludes merely indefinite or nebulous discussion 
about a possible sale.  While this requirement may be met by a patentee’s 
commercial activity which does not rise to the level of a formal ‘offer’ under 
contract law principles, a definite offer in the contract sense clearly meets this 
requirement.” (citations omitted)). 
 202. Id.; accord In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter 
Patent Litig., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]hether a device has been 
placed on sale is not subject to a mechanical rule. . . . Our court has stressed 
that commercialization is the central focus for determining whether the 
patented invention has been placed on sale.” (citations omitted)); Sonoscan, Inc. 
v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the price 
quote as sufficient to trigger the on-sale bar). 
 203. Beginning in 2001, the Federal Circuit adopted a different 
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that Congress intended the phrase “offer to sell” to encompass 
advertisements and related promotional activities. 
2. The Meaning of “Offer” in View of its Legislative 
History and Adoption Pursuant to an 
International Treaty 
The legislative history provides almost no instruction 
about the intent or meaning of the term “offer” in § 271(a).204  
As discussed, Congress added offer to sell as an act of 
infringement pursuant to the TRIPS agreement.205  Further, 
the context surrounding the statutory amendment suggests 
that Congress added the language to strengthen patent 
holders’ protections under § 271 and to align U.S. patent law 
more closely with that of the international community.206 
Although TRIPS more closely aligned international 
patent (and other intellectual property) laws, it did not 
mandate standardization of international patent law.  TRIPS 
requires countries to enact certain minimum standards for 
patent protection (e.g., to make offers to sell an act of 
infringement), but it does not dictate specific definitions.207  
Instead, TRIPS envisions a flexible implementation.208  
Further, TRIPS does not require one country to consult 
another participant country’s laws relating to a TRIPS 
 
understanding of the on-sale bar.  See infra notes 267–69 and accompanying 
text. 
 204. See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1252 (“Unfortunately, other than stating 
that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only those offers ‘in which the sale will occur 
before the expiration of the term of the patent,’ Congress offered no other 
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase. . . . [T]he legislative history of the 
statute offers little additional insight.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (Supp. 1997))). 
 205. TRIPS, supra note 132. 
 206. See, e.g., Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1253 (“[W]e must recognize one of the 
agreements’ declared purposes: harmonizing worldwide patent law.”); Hearings, 
supra note 161 (“With its signing in Marrakech, we established international 
standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property that were 
unthinkable only a decade ago.”). 
 207. See CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 57 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909320 (“There may also be great 
diversity in laws because the minimums [required by TRIPS] are often 
undefined, leaving room for variation.  Thus, TRIPS does not contemplate or 
result in uniform laws.”). 
 208. Whether a country’s implementation fails to meet TRIPS’s minimum 
requirements is decided by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which 
provides that all terms are interpreted according to customary rules of 
international law.  Id. at 60. 
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provision, and U.S. laws enacted to comply with TRIPS do not 
call for standardization.209 
Although consulting other countries’ interpretations of 
the term “offer” is not required under TRIPS, such 
interpretations provide persuasive authority as to its 
meaning.210  As the Federal Circuit has recognized, the fact 
that “the United States agreed to [include offers to sell as an 
act of infringement], suggest[s] that the amendment to  
§ 271(a) reflects the approaches of the other signatory 
nations.”211  Thus, consulting foreign nations’ interpretations 
of their patent laws relating to infringement for offering to 
sell infringing technology is helpful to understanding the 
scope of § 271(a).  In the next two subsections, this Article 
considers United Kingdom and German interpretations of the 
offer concept.  This Article reviews these two countries for two 
primary reasons.212  First, not all countries have judicial 
decisions addressing the issue.213  Second, the U.K. and 
Germany are similar in many respects to the United States in 
 
 209. See Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to 
Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19–24 
(2005). 
 210. Id. at 41 n.184. 
 211. Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1253.  Nevertheless, the Rotec court went on to 
reject the approach of the U.K., a signatory nation.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 257–59. 
 212. Additionally, these countries were considered because their court 
decisions were more easily available in English. 
 213. Research revealed no cases in Canada or Australia directly interpreting 
the meaning of the term offer or discussing whether offer includes 
advertisements.  Interestingly, Canadian patent law does not appear to prohibit 
offers to sell infringing products, despite Canada’s obligations under TRIPS 
Article 28.  Canada’s patent laws give the patentee “the exclusive right, 
privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and 
selling it to others to be used,” but does not mention offers to sell.  Patent Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, § 42 (1985).  The Federal Court of Australia has hinted that 
the right to exploit should be construed broadly, since “[t]he definition of 
‘exploit’ in the present Act is not exhaustive; it ‘includes’ the matters specified.” 
Azuko Pty. Ltd. v Old Digger Pty. Ltd. (2001) 52 IPR 75, ¶ 118 (Austl.).  Further, 
one decision might imply that a letter soliciting offers to buy would constitute 
an offer.  In Air-Cell Innovations Pty. Ltd. v Tanwing Int’l Pty. Ltd. (2006) FCA 
1117 (Austl.), the court granted an injunction based on evidence that the 
defendant sold an infringing product and/or offered the infringing product for 
sale.  Id. ¶ 23.  The evidence of the offer was a “distribution of letters to a 
number of potential purchasers” and “a number of entities contacted by the 
respondent as potential purchasers of the product.”  Id. ¶ 15.  Unfortunately, 
the court did not detail the letters’ contents, and thus they may have amounted 
to a formal contract law offer. 
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that they are among the richest and most developed countries 
in the world and are net patent exporters.214 
i. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s patent law creates liability for 
infringement when a person “makes, disposes of, offers to 
dispose of, uses or imports” a patented product without 
permission in the U.K.215  The U.K. statute’s “offers to dispose 
of” parallels the U.S. statute’s “offers to sell.”  While the 
U.K.’s term “disposes” arguably connotes a broader category 
of transactions than the U.S.’s “sells”216 (e.g., offers of gifts), 
both statutes use the identical word offer, and both should 
interpret “offer” in the same way. 
Since at least 1995, U.K. patent decisions have 
interpreted the term “offer” broadly, as evidenced by the 
decision in Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems 
Ltd.217  The defendant in Gerber began advertising an 
infringing machine (an expensive apparatus for automatic 
cutting of fabrics) about two years before completing any sale 
and argued that advertising was not an act of infringement.218  
The Gerber court had “no hesitation in rejecting” the 
argument that the term “offer” included only contract law 
offers.219  The court interpreted “offer” to include 
advertisements and individual solicitations, recognizing that 
 
 214. Developed countries that create a relatively large number of patentable 
inventions will tend to want strong patent rights.  Developing countries that 
generate less patentable inventions generally prefer weaker patent rights to 
give them access to other countries’ technology.  See, e.g., Ho, supra note 207, at 
59–60; Lee, supra note 209, at 20; J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement 
Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000). 
 215. Patents Act of 1977, 1977 c. 37 § 60(1)(a), (Eng.) (emphasis added).  
Others have helpfully discussed the state of the U.K.’s patent laws regarding 
offers to dispose.  See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 784–86; David Sulkis, Note, 
Patent Infringement by Offer To Sell: Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi 
Corporation, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1099, 1112–16 (2001). 
 216. Indeed, other areas of the U.K. Patents Act distinguish between selling 
and disposing.  See Patents Act of 1977, 1977 c. 37 § 55(1)(a)(ii) (allowing, in 
certain circumstances, the government to “sell or offer to sell [another’s 
patented product] for foreign defence purposes or for the production or supply of 
specified drugs and medicines, or dispose or offer to dispose of it (otherwise than 
by selling it) for any purpose whatever” (emphasis added)). 
 217. [1995] 13 R.P.C. 383 (Eng.). 
 218. Id. at 411. 
 219. Id. 
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such acts “disturb[] the patentee’s monopoly.”220  Thus, U.K. 
patent law recognizes that advertisements and other 
promotions harm patentees and should be prevented. 
It is worth noting that when interpreting the term “offer,” 
the Gerber court relied in part221 on a treaty to which the U.K. 
was at the time a signatory, the Convention for the European 
Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent 
Convention, or simply CPC).222  The CPC was an early 
attempt to create a uniform European patent law223 that 
never became binding because too few EU member states 
ratified it.224  Although not ratified by all EU members,225 the 
CPC provides insight into both English226 and EU countries’ 
views regarding the appropriate interpretation of 
infringement for an offer to sell.  Specifically, Article 25 
provides that a “Community patent shall confer on its 
proprietor the right to prevent all third parties not having his 
consent . . . from making, offering, putting on the market or 
using a product which is the subject-matter of the patent.”227 
“Putting on the market” is a broad term that would seem 
to include at least formal advertising if not less formal 
 
 220. Id. at 411–12 (declining, specifically, to limit offer to a contract law 
definition and stating that one “who approaches potential customers 
individually or by advertisement saying he is willing to supply a machine, terms 
to be agreed, is offering it” (emphasis added)). 
 221. The court noted that under § 130(7) of the U.K. Patents Act, the 
language at issue should be “so framed as to have, as nearly as practicable, the 
same effects in the United Kingdom as the corresponding provisions of the . . . 
CPC.”  Id. 
 222. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market 
(Community Patent Convention), 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1, available at 
http://legis.obi.gr/espacedvd/legal_texts/LAWS_E/eu_cvn01.htm [hereinafter 
CPC].  The CPC, which was signed December 15, 1975, but never became 
effective, should not be confused with the European Patent Convention (EPC), 
also known as the Munich Convention, which was signed in Munich, Germany, 
on October 5, 1973 and became effective on October 7, 1977.  European Patent 
Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. 
 223. Seth Cannon, Note, Achieving the Benefits of a Centralized Community 
Patent System at Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 420–21 (2003). 
 224. See id. at 421. 
 225. The failure of the CPC did not have anything to do with the scope of the 
offer provisions, but centered on issues such as sovereignty and in what 
languages the patents would be published.  See Vincenzo Di Cataldo, From the 
European Patent to Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19, 28–29 (2002). 
 226. Though it has since repealed its implementation of the CPC, the U.K. 
had at one time adopted the CPC.  See Patents Act of 1977 c.37 § 86 (1977) 
(Eng.) (repealed 2004). 
 227. CPC, supra note 222, art. 25(a) (emphasis added). 
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promotions.  By including the phrase “putting on the market” 
in the CPC, the drafters demonstrated that they considered it 
necessary to prohibit more than contract law offers in order to 
protect patentees.  The CPC’s prohibition of advertisements 
and other promotions influenced the Gerber court and can 
provide persuasive authority to American courts in 
interpreting patent law’s offer concept. 
ii. Germany 
Consistent with U.K. courts, German courts hold that the 
term offer “must be understood in the economic sense and 
does not coincide with the legal term of a contract offer,”228 
but rather includes advertising and related commercial 
marketing.229  Thus, German patent law dating back at least 
to the 1960’s230 supports an interpretation of an offer that is 
broader than a contract law offer. 
Because Germany was a party to the TRIPS negotiations, 
its pre-TRIPS understanding of an offer to sell in the patent 
infringement context suggests a meaning for the term offer to 
sell in TRIPS.  Congress provided no guidance or legislative 
history with its adoption of this TRIPS provision; thus, a 
logical assumption is that Congress adopted the meaning 
used by the major countries favoring the inclusion of offering 
to sell as a mode of infringement.  In addition, as with the 
U.K.’s interpretation of offer, Germany’s interpretation better 
aligns with the policy of preventing an infringer from 
generating interest in another’s patented technology to the 
harm of the patentee. 
 
 
 228. MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT § 3.3, at 100 n.106 (2012) (quoting Thermocycler, 
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2 U 58/05, Dec. 21, 2006, 2007 GRUR-RR 261). 
 229. See TRIMBLE, supra note 228, § 3.3 (citing, inter alia, 
Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, Bundesgerichtshof, I ZR 109/58, Mar. 29, 1960, 1960 
GRUR 423; Kupplung für optische Geräte, Bundesgerichtshof, X ZR 179/02, 
Sept. 16, 2003; Reichsgericht, I 137/33, Jan. 13, 1934, RGZ 29, 173; 
Zeitlagenmultiplexverfahren, Landgericht Düsseldorf, 4a O 124/05, Feb. 13, 
2007; and Schricker, supra note 209, at 787). 
 230. See Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, supra note 229 (decided in 1960).  
Interestingly, German law prohibited infringing offers to sell as far back as 
1877.  See TRIMBLE, supra note 228, § 3.3. 
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3. Construing “Offer” in View of Other Statutes 
Debate exists regarding the extent to which a statute’s 
words may be interpreted in light of other portions of the 
same statute or of related statutes.231  Where one party urges 
a specific construction, courts sometimes compare the 
language at issue to similar language in the same or related 
statutes to demonstrate that Congress knows how to legislate 
for a specific result when it wants to.232 
For example, in Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,233 the 
Supreme Court held that the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows 
contractors (e.g., a university) to elect to retain title in 
patentable inventions generated during work that the 
government funded, did not divest individual inventors of 
their rights to inventions234 made during federally-funded 
work.235  The Court noted that “Congress has in the past 
divested inventors of their rights in inventions by providing 
unambiguously” for such divestiture in other statutes, but 
“[s]uch language is notably absent from the Bayh-Dole Act.”236  
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress knows how to divest 
inventors of their rights, but did not do so in the Bayh-Dole 
Act. 
The concept that Congress knows how to craft precise 
legislation may have strong appeal at times, especially when 
Congress fails to use a term of art that it consistently uses in 
other statutes to capture a desired meaning.237  This logic 
 
 231. See YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RECENT TRENDS 13–17 (2009). 
 232. See id. 
 233. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011). 
 234. Under U.S. patent law, the rights to an invention initially vest in the 
individual inventor(s), not the inventor’s employer.  Id. at 2195.  The inventor 
may assign in advance her rights to any subsequent invention to her employer, 
but the rights nevertheless initially vested with the employee.  Id. 
 235. Id. at 2197–99. 
 236. Id. at 2195–96. 
 237. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (“Congress 
has included an express overt-act requirement in at least 22 other current 
conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows how to impose such a 
requirement when it wishes to do so.”); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson 538 U.S. 
468, 476 (2003) (construing the word owner to mean direct owner as opposed to 
indirect owner, and noting that “[w]here Congress intends to refer to ownership 
in other than the formal sense, it knows how to do so.”); Meghrig v. KFC W., 
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (“Congress . . . demonstrated in CERCLA that it 
knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and . . . the language 
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could be applied to the offer concept.  For example, recall that 
§ 32(a) of the Lanham Act mentions both offers to sell and 
advertisements.238  Since courts should “construe statutes, 
where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any 
parts thereof,”239 the Lanham Act appears to treat offers to 
sell and advertisements as non-coterminous.  Can one 
conclude, therefore, that Congress knows how to distinguish 
between advertisements and offers to sell and yet did not do 
so in § 271(a)?  Since Congress did not do so in § 271(a), the 
logic suggests Congress did not intend to include anything 
other than contract law offers. 
Yet the concept that Congress knows how to legislate for 
a specific result has weaknesses in the context of the offer 
concept.  Specifically, Congress has not used the term offer to 
sell in a unified way throughout the law.  Although Congress 
has at times explicitly mentioned both advertisements and 
offers in a statute, in other statutes (e.g., the ESA) it 
mentions only offers to sell and yet subsequent 
interpretations have defined the phrase to include 
advertisements.240  Further, where a term like offer to sell has 
evolved in meaning over time, an assumption that Congress 
used it in a specific way opposes the canon of statutory 
construction (discussed above)241 that Congress uses a term in 
light of its meaning at the time of enactment. 
As Karl Llewellyn argued years ago,242 the arguments 
and counter-arguments can carry on.243  Perhaps the inclusion 
 
used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy.”); Cent. 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176–77 
(1994), superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78. (“Congress knew how to 
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so.  If, as respondents 
seem to say, Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we 
presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text.  But 
it did not.” (citations omitted)). 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006); see supra text accompanying note 54. 
 239. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see 
also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (stating that 
interpreting word law broadly could render word regulation superfluous in 
preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971); Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms 
because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”). 
 240. See supra Part II.C. 
 241. See supra notes 170–97 and accompanying text. 
 242. Llewellyn, supra note 173. 
 243. Further, one can characterize Congress’s failure to discuss advertising 
in § 271(a) as evidence that Congress invited courts to decide the contours of the 
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of advertising in the Lanham Act may be explained in part on 
trademark law’s historic connection to advertising, since 
trademarks are used heavily in advertising.244  In addition, 
the Lanham Act had the benefit of years of common law 
development (both regarding trademarks and unfair 
competition) preceding it,245 whereas patent law’s offer to sell 
provision was brought about quickly to comply with the 
United States’ obligations under the TRIPS agreement.246 
In the end, given the diversity of definitions for the offer 
concept in the law, the best route would have been for 
Congress explicitly to define it.  Nevertheless, one can argue 
(though how persuasively is open for debate) that Congress 
knows how to define the offer concept as something other 
than the contract law definition when it wants to, and that its 
failure to do so in § 271(a) supports a contract law meaning 
for offer to sell therein. 
C. Summary 
Constructing an optimal definition for the offer concept in 
patent law requires a careful policy-based analysis.  The 
leading policy behind making an offer to sell an act of patent 
infringement is to prevent a patent holder from being harmed 
by another’s unauthorized commercialization of the patented 
technology.247  Because an entity can generate commercial 
interest in technology by engaging in advertising and 
promotions that harm the patentee via price erosion, patent 
law’s offer concept should include not only contract law offers, 
but also advertising and promotions. 
 
 
offer concept or that they had not thought of the issue at all.  See YULE KIM, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16 (2008) (“In some cases, Congress intends 
silence to rule out a particular statutory application, while in others Congress’ 
silence signifies merely an expectation that nothing more need be said in order 
to effectuate the relevant legislative objective.  In still other instances, silence 
may reflect the fact that Congress has not considered an issue at all.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948). 
 245. See, e.g., Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of 
Trademarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 178 (1949); Keith Stolte, How 
Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s 
Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 506-09 (1998). 
 246. See TRIPS, supra note 132, and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 140–42. 
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In addition to a policy-based analysis of what the offer 
concept should encompass, an analysis of the statutory 
language and surrounding context provides conflicting 
direction regarding the proper construction.  Some would 
argue that statutory construction is almost always doomed to 
such confusion.248  Certainly the preferred result would have 
been for Congress to provide a detailed definition in the 
statute.  That did not happen, however, and thus this Article 
turns to consider the best way forward for using the offer 
concept in patent law as well as other areas of the law. 
IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE USES OF THE OFFER CONCEPT: 
THOUGHTS ON A WAY FORWARD 
The offer concept began as an eighteenth-century 
innovation in the law of contracts and has since infiltrated 
areas of the law as diverse as intellectual property and 
criminal law.  As the offer concept migrated into new areas of 
the law, it acquired a diversity of meanings.  Sometimes 
lawmakers carefully crafted the definition of the offer concept 
for its new legal environment, whereas at other times they 
inserted the offer concept with no discussion or guidance as to 
its meaning.  Given the myriad potential definitions for the 
offer concept, its meaning is far from clear if it appears in a 
statute without definition.  In the subsections that follow, this 
Article suggests guidelines for how legislatures and courts 
should handle the offer concept when it is used in the law. 
A. The Offer Concept in Patent Law 
This Article first considers a way forward for the offer 
concept in patent law.  But discussing the way forward 
requires an understanding of the current state of the law, 
which is provided in the following subsection. 
 
 
 248. See Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 401–03; Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics 
and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1990) 
(“Maxims, after Llewellyn’s work, were considered by most legal academics to be 
mere conclusory explanations appended after the fact to justify results reached 
on other grounds.”). 
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1. The Current Scope of the Offer Concept Under  
§ 271(a) 
The Federal Circuit has slowly (and somewhat fitfully) 
fleshed out what amounts to an offer to sell that infringes 
under § 271(a).249  The first clarification came in 3D Systems, 
Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc.,250 a case dealing not with a 
substantive patent question, but with whether specific 
personal jurisdiction251 existed based on an alleged offer to 
sell an infringing device.252  Albeit in dicta,253 the court took a 
broad view of what constitutes an offer to sell.  Applying 
federal common law to the question,254 the court indicated 
 
 249. Other aspects of the scope of an offer to sell under § 271(a) have been 
analyzed and further defined, but these aspects are not directly relevant to this 
Article’s focus on the scope of the offer concept.  See, e.g., Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308–
10 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (examining the extraterritorial reach of infringement for an 
offer to sell and separately holding that an infringing offer to sell may occur 
even if the device offered for sale was not built when the offer was made); 
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding 
that “a mere offer to sell a machine [that can perform a patented method] 
cannot serve as the sole basis for finding infringement of the claimed method”); 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2119, 2151 (2008) (examining the extraterritorial reach of infringement for 
an offer to sell); Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After 
Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1094–99 (2012) (same); Rex W. Miller, II, 
Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests 
Rather Than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403 
(2009). 
 250. 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 251. Under Federal Circuit law, personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant exists when the relevant state’s long-arm statute permits the 
assertion of jurisdiction without violating federal due process.  See, e.g., Akro 
Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 252. A second personal jurisdiction case, HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 
F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), dealt not with the definition of offer, but rather of 
sell under § 271(a).  The court held that the offered donation was not an offer to 
sell under the statute where the offered donation was small and insignificant, 
the donation was never consummated, and the would-be donor appeared not to 
be motivated by any current or future commercial gain.  Id. at 1309–10.  The 
HollyAnne court’s focus on sell rather than offer renders it less relevant to this 
Article’s analysis. 
 253. Because 3D Systems concerned personal jurisdiction and not substantive 
patent law, its pronouncements about the scope of an infringing offer to sell are 
dicta as related to substantive patent law.  See Larry S. Zelson, Comment, The 
Illusion of “Offer to Sell” Patent Infringement: When an Offer is an Offer But is 
Not an Offer, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1283, 1289–99 (2006) (criticizing the Federal 
Circuit’s conflation of offer to sell and specific personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence). 
 254. 3D Sys., at 1379. 
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that a price quotation could infringe because “[o]ne of the 
purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to § 271(a) was to prevent 
exactly the type of activity [the accused infringer] has 
engaged in, i.e., generating interest in a potential infringing 
product to the commercial detriment of the rightful 
patentee.”255 
 Thus, in its first exploration of the offer concept, the 
Federal Circuit suggested that something less than a formal, 
contract law offer (a price quotation) could count as an offer 
under § 271(a).  This interpretation was short lived.  Two 
years later the Federal Circuit for the first time squarely 
addressed the standard for offer to sell infringement on the 
merits in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.256 and 
concluded that it should “define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ 
liability according to the norms of traditional contractual 
analysis.”257  The court refused (without significant 
discussion) to adopt the 3D Systems panel’s potentially 
broader definition of “offer.”258 
While the Rotec court did not explicitly address its 
reasons for adopting the contract law standard for an offer, 
the court appears to have been heavily influenced by its own 
understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v. 
Wells Electronics, Inc.259  The Pfaff Court considered the 
meaning of the on-sale bar in § 102(b), discussed above.260  
The Pfaff decision devoted the bulk of its attention to how 
complete the invention must be before it can be on sale,261 an 
 
 255. Id. at 1379.  “The price quotation letters . . . state on their face that they 
are purportedly not offers, but to treat them as anything other than offers to sell 
would be to exalt form over substance. . . . As a matter of federal statutory 
construction, the price quotation letters can be regarded as ‘offer[s] to sell’ 
under § 271 based on the substance conveyed in the letters, i.e., a description of 
the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it can be 
purchased.”  Id. 
 256. 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 257. Id. at 1254–55; see also id. at 1257 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)). 
 258. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
 259. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 260. See supra notes 195–203 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60 (stating that the reason the court granted 
certiorari was that “other courts have held or assumed that an invention cannot 
be ‘on sale’ within the meaning of § 102(b) unless and until it has been reduced 
to practice and because the text of § 102(b) makes no reference to ‘substantial 
completion’ of an invention, we granted certiorari” (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)).  The court rejected both the reduced to practice test and the 
OSBORN FINAL 6/24/2013  7:55 PM 
2013] THE LEAKY COMMON LAW 197 
inquiry not relevant to whether a contract law offer is 
required under §102(b).  Nevertheless, one paragraph of the 
opinion stated that to trigger the on-sale bar, “the product 
must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale.”262 
The Court did not expound much on what it meant by 
“commercial offer for sale,” but the remaining sentences of the 
single paragraph discussing the issue provide a strong clue.  
The Court stated, 
An inventor can both understand and control the timing of 
the first commercial marketing of his invention.  The 
experimental use doctrine, for example, has not generated 
concerns about indefiniteness, and we perceive no reason 
why unmanageable uncertainty should attend a rule that 
measures the application of the on-sale bar of § 102(b) 
against the date when an invention that is ready for 
patenting is first marketed commercially.263 
As the emphasized text highlights, the Court understood 
the phrase “commercial offer for sale” to refer to commercial 
marketing.264  The term “marketing,” which is defined as “the 
act or process of promoting and selling products or 
services,”265 is much broader that the contract law “offer to 
sell,” and its ordinary meaning at least encompasses 
advertising, if not less formal promotions.  Thus, one could 
read Pfaff to concur with earlier Federal Circuit cases that 
understood the term “on sale” to include advertising and 
other commercializing activity.266 
Despite the Pfaff court’s reference to a broad marketing 
standard for the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit in Group 
One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.267 interpreted the language 
used in Pfaff to “strongly suggest[] that the offer must meet 
the level of an offer for sale in the contract sense, one that 
would be understood as such in the commercial 
 
substantial completion test and held that for an invention to be on sale, it must 
be “ready for patenting.”  Id. at 67. 
 262. Id. (emphasis added).  The Court most likely provided this additional 
clarification of the on-sale bar since it was overruling the Federal Circuit’s 
totality of the circumstances test, which considered, among other things, the 
invention’s completeness and the level of commercialization.  See id. at 66 n.11. 
 263. Id. at 67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 264. See id. 
 265. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 1999). 
 266. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 267. 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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community.”268  The Group One court justified this conclusion 
with reference to the Pfaff court’s desire for greater 
certainty.269  While it is true that Pfaff called for great 
certainty in the on-sale bar analysis, determining what 
constitutes a contract law offer to sell is arguably no more 
certain than determining what constitutes an advertisement, 
solicitation, or promotion.270  Further, the Group One court’s 
interpretation of Pfaff makes no reference to the Pfaff court’s 
use of the term “marketing,” which strongly suggests a 
broader meaning for commercial “offer to sell.” 
The Federal Circuit’s conclusion to treat the on-sale bar 
as requiring a contract law offer was ill-advised and has 
invited criticism.271  Aside from its shortcomings in the on-
sale bar context, the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of Pfaff 
has influenced its decisions under § 271(a).  The Federal 
Circuit in Rotec stated that “the analysis of an ‘offer to sell’ 
under § 271(a) is consistent with the [Supreme] Court’s 
analysis in Pfaff of § 102(b).”272  Since the Federal Circuit 
understood Pfaff as teaching that “the norms of traditional 
contract law should be the basis for the on-sale 
determinations under § 102(b),” the court allowed its 
 
 268. Id. at 1046. 
 269. Id. at 1047 (“Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than 
some more amorphous test, implements the broad goal of Pfaff, which, in 
replacing this court's ‘totality of the circumstances’ test with more precise 
requirements, was to bring greater certainty to the analysis of the on-sale 
bar.”). 
 270. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 781–83 (arguing that the contract law 
offer to sell standard lacks clarity). 
 271. See, e.g., Frank Albert, Note, Reformulating the On Sale Bar, 28 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81, 88 (2005) (noting that the current on-sale bar 
test “allows inventors to . . . begin building demand for their invention  
. . . [because they] may advertise, give price quotes, [and] send product samples 
to potential customers” (footnotes omitted)); Holbrook, supra note 149, at 780–
84, 799 (noting problems with the commercial offer for sale portion of the on-
sale bar and arguing that “the focus [of the § 102(b) on-sale bar] should be on 
what was in the public domain, as opposed to the exact nature of the 
transaction”); Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the 
Structure and Negotiation of Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
181, 206 (2004) (outlining strategies for an inventor wishing to commercialize 
its invention without triggering the offer prong of the on-sale bar); Stephen 
Bruce Lindholm, Comment, Revisiting Pfaff and the On-Sale Bar, 15 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 213, 217 (2004) (noting that “parties are sometimes able to avoid 
meeting the [on-sale bar] through careful contracting”). 
 272. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
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understanding to control the meaning of § 271(a).273  The 
result is that the offer concept in § 271(a) fails to align 
optimally with its policy rationales.274 
In cases after Rotec, the Federal Circuit has interpreted 
an “offer to sell” under § 271(a) according to the norms of 
traditional contract law.275  Interestingly, the same cases 
recognize that the primary policy underlying offer to sell 
infringement is to prevent a competitor from generating 
interest in an infringing product to the commercial detriment 
of the patentee.276  Yet the Federal Circuit never discusses the 
fact that the policy against allowing competitors to generate 
commercial interest (1) suggests patent law’s offer concept 
should include advertisements and other promotions, and (2) 
differs dramatically from the primary policy undergirding the 
contract law offer concept, which is to balance freedom-from 
and freedom-to contract. 
2. How to Correct the Scope of the Offer Concept Under  
§ 271(a) 
To correct these shortcomings, the Federal Circuit has at 
least two options.  First, as an en banc court, it could overrule 
its Rotec decision regarding § 271(a) and broaden the offer 
concept to include advertisements and other promotional 
activities.277  In the alternative, sitting en banc, it could 
overrule the Group One panel’s interpretation of the on-sale 
 
 273. Id.  “Both sections invoke the traditional contractual analysis.  
Therefore, we similarly define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to the 
norms of traditional contractual analysis.”  Id. at 1254–55. 
 274. See supra Part III.A. 
 275. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 
Contrators USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Rotec Indus., 
215 F.3d at 1246); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon 
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 
1255 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)). 
 276. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309; MEMC, 420 F.3d at 1376 (noting that 
“[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to section 271(a) was to prevent  
. . . generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial 
detriment of the rightful patentee”). 
 277. While it can be argued that § 102(b) and § 271(a) should have the same 
scope, case law does not require this result.  Recall that the 3D Systems panel 
“decline[d] to import the authority construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) into 
the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a).”  3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 
F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Although the Rotec court noted that its 
interpretation of § 271(a) was consistent with that of § 102(b), it did not require 
such consistency.  See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1254. 
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bar and instead interpret the Supreme Court’s Pfaff decision 
to include advertisements and promotions.  Such a decision 
would not only better align § 102(b)’s on-sale bar with its 
underlying policies, but also would effectively overrule the 
Federal Circuit’s Rotec decision under § 271(a), which was 
influenced by the Group One court’s interpretation of Pfaff.  
Under this scenario, a subsequent Federal Circuit panel 
would be free to realign the scope of the offer concept under  
§ 271(a). 
If the Federal Circuit does not correct the scope of 
271(a)’s offer concept, the Supreme Court could do so.  The 
Court has increasingly taken an interest in patent cases278 
and may be willing to take another.  As discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, a decision altering the scope of either § 
102(b)’s on-sale bar or § 271(a)’s offer concept would allow 
reform to § 271(a).  The Court may be willing to consider an 
on-sale bar case if it believes the Federal Circuit’s Group One 
decision misinterpreted its Pfaff decision, but this becomes 
less likely as more time passes since the Group One decision 
in 2001. 
Finally, of course, Congress itself could bring clarity to 
the offer concept in § 271(a).  If Congress chose to act, it 
should at a minimum make clear that advertisements should 
be included in the definition of an offer.  Further, solicitations 
and promotional activities that might reasonably affect 
market prices should be included.  Drawing the precise line 
between those promotional activities that might affect market 
prices and those that would not might be difficult.  To protect 
patent holder’s more fully, Congress could err on the side of a 
broad definition of promotional activities, knowing that 
patent holders will likely not find it cost-effective to bring 
suits in cases where proving damages will be difficult.279  It is, 
 
 278. See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012). 
 279. An exception to this might be certain nonpracticing entities (pejoratively 
referred to as patent trolls), who might bring suit simply for the opportunity of 
settlement money, which defendants may pay even in meritless cases to avoid 
expensive discovery and litigation costs.  See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, 
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The 
Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012); John M. Golden, “Patent 
Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007).   To the extent that 
the defendant has only offered to sell the product but has not sold the product 
and does not plan to sell the product, the defendant could try to minimize 
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however, unlikely that Congress will be eager to take up 
patent legislation in the near future, having passed 
multifaceted patent legislation in 2011.280  Therefore, courts 
should strive to improve the offer concept in the near term. 
B. The Offer Concept in the Law Generally 
In some areas of the law, such as the Securities Act of 
1933, Congress provided relatively detailed definitions of the 
offer concept, which suggests careful thought as to the policy 
role that the offer concept would play.281  In other areas of the 
law, like patent law and many criminal statutes, the offer 
concept is included with little or no discussion of its meaning 
in the statute or its history.  Because the offer concept has so 
many different definitions in the law, a legislature’s failure to 
provide a definition or guidance invites confusion.  As this 
Article has attempted to demonstrate, it is unlikely that the 
offer concept’s policy role in contract law will correlate to its 
role in another area of law.282  Thus, legislatures should 
provide guidance as to the offer concept’s role, none the less 
its meaning, within a statute. 
The various statutes using the offer concept discussed in 
this Article raise many questions.  For example, it is unclear 
why the Lanham Act prohibits advertisements in § 32, but 
prohibits advertisements and promotions in § 43.283  The 
Endangered Species Act and its regulations indicate only that 
advertisements qualify as offers to sell—do less formal 
promotions qualify as well?284  While numerous criminal laws 
prohibit certain offers to sell contraband, many do not define 
the scope of the offer concept.285  The optimal scope of the offer 
concept in each area of the law will depend on many factors.  
While a broad definition of offer would perhaps minimize the 
undesirable activity (e.g., infringement of trafficking), 
 
litigation costs by asking the court to bifurcate the trial and first determine the 
damages.  If the plaintiff could not prove damages from price erosion, then the 
suit would be relatively inexpensive to defend: the defendant who does not plan 
to sell the product could stipulate to infringement and avoid expensive 
discovery. 
 280. Congress passed the America Invents Act in 2011.  See supra note 196. 
 281. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2006). 
 282. See supra Part II. 
 283. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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broadening the definition too much may have undesired 
ancillary consequences.  Legislatures are well equipped to 
handle these fact and policy-intensive inquiries and should 
endeavor to provide as much guidance as possible. 
As with any legislation, there is a tension between a 
legislature’s desire to provide specific guidance and its 
hesitancy to legislate with excessive rigidity.  Legislatures 
understand their own lack of omniscience and may prefer to 
give some flexibility to courts.286  Where legislatures want to 
give courts flexibility, they should be relatively clear about 
their intent; given the varying meanings of the offer concept 
in the law, a court might otherwise unnecessarily fixate on a 
specific meaning that the legislature never intended.  Where 
possible, legislatures should generally strive to explain the 
broader contours of the offer concept as used in a particular 
statute.  For example, making the threshold decision whether 
the offer concept will include advertisements would be 
particularly helpful.  As to whether it should provide more 
specific guidance, the legislature must weigh its ability to 
craft a detailed rule against the potential need for flexibility 
in the law’s development.287  However specific the legislature 
decides to be, it should explain the policies behind the offer 
concept in the statute to guide courts in future cases. 
When courts are faced with interpreting an ill-defined 
(and therefore ambiguous) offer concept, they should look to 
the policy role of the concept in the statute.  Since it is 
unlikely that the offer concept’s policy role in a specific legal 
area will be similar to its role in contract law,288 courts should 
be hesitant to presume that a term like offer to sell should 
carry its common law meaning.  Courts can rebut the 
presumption that offer should carry its contract law meaning 
by pointing to the disparate meanings of the offer concept 
appearing throughout the law. 
 
 286. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 170, at 811–12. 
 287. The costs and benefits of detailed rules versus flexible standards have 
been exhaustively discussed.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M. 
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
 288. See supra Part II. 
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CONCLUSION 
Contract law’s definition of an offer helps balance 
freedom-to and freedom-from contract.  Other areas of law 
have incorporated the offer concept, but have used it in a very 
different way than contract law; namely, to regulate certain 
undesirable behaviors.  As each area of the law uses the offer 
concept in a different policy role, it should adapt the concept’s 
definition in a way consonant with its new role.  The optimal 
definition for an offer concept that regulates undesirable 
behaviors will typically be different than the contract law 
definition, and thus legislatures should be particularly 
careful to provide guidance as to its meaning.  Additionally, 
courts should hesitate to presume the legislature intended 
the contract law definition and should look to the 
contemporaneous meanings of the offer concept in analogous 
statutes.  Courts should also consider the policy role of the 
offer concept.  Where the concept is a tool to prevent 
commercialization of an item, the offer concept should 
generally be construed to include not only contract law offers, 
but also advertisements and promotional activity. 
 
